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WHO'S MINDING YOUR BUSINESS?
Preliminary Observations on Data and Anecdotes
Collected on the Role of Institutional Investors in
Corporate Governance
Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein*

I.

INTRODUCTION

This article is an annotated collection of empirical data, anecdotes, and other observations on the role of institutional investors in

corporate governance. It is not meant to be exhaustive. The primary
purpose of this article is to report, in a timely manner, the results of

*

Associate Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law.
The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Fund for Labor Relations Studies and Texas Tech University School of Law. Without their support, empirical
research of this magnitude would not have been possible.
Thanks also to all of the people who generously gave of their time to respond to the
survey. Their interest and commitment ensured a survey with a good response rate.
Gratitude is especially extended to Dr. Benjamin Bates of Texas Tech University, and
to Dr. James Dyer of Texas A & M University, both survey experts, who assisted us in designing the survey and planning follow-up. Thanks also to Peg O'Hara of the Investor
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) for permission to base some of our survey questions
on IRRC materials. In particular, we relied on Writing Proxy Voting Guidelines-A
Handbook for Institutional Investors published by IRRC. Thanks to Nell Minow, now with
the Lens Fund, and Sharon Cayelli, formerly with the Council of Institutional Investors, for
their suggestions on our survey questions.
This survey would not have been possible without the help of students who spent
countless hours working on the surveys. I am particularly indebted to Chuck Kretek whose
enthusiasm for the project was unmatched. Chuck had enthusiasm for even the tedious and
enormously time-consuming task of gathering addresses for the people to be surveyed. Chuck
did all of the background research, prepared the first draft of the survey, and graduated.
Three students replaced Chuck Tim Brown skillfully supervised the pension survey and
the collection of proxy anecdotes, and discussed the nuances of jazz during otherwise tedious
mass mailings. Jim Iserman was in charge of the investment manager and proxy guideline
surveys. Jim was our computer expert: he formatted the surveys, did all of the graphics and
taught me how to use a mouse. Martin Illner, our enigmatic world traveller, was in charge of
the director survey and helped edit the article. Martin claims that he got a suntan from the
computer screen but I suspect the tan really was from skiing and mountain-climbing in
Mexico. Finally, thanks to Jack Elrod who filled in the gaps when we needed him.
Special thanks to Leona Wyatt, who calmly and patiently retyped the forty pages the
computer mysteriously gobbled up.
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three original surveys on the role of institutional investors in corporate governance and one additional survey on proxy voting guidelines.' The three surveys on corporate governance and proxy voting
were conducted from May through September 9, 1992 and the survey
of proxy voting guidelines was conducted from April through August
1992. The data and anecdotes collected have been supplemented with
anecdotes and empirical evidence collected by others. This article
contains preliminary observations on the data we collected. Readers
are invited to comment on these observations. In a sequel article, we
hope to examine in greater detail some of the issues we surveyed and
offer solutions for some of the problems described.2
Originally, we intended only to survey union and public pension
fund trustees to determine the extent of their interest and involvement
in monitoring corporate performance and influencing corporate governance. Although many public pension funds are active in corporate
governance, our research and experience led us to believe that union
funds are slow to follow.' We designed a survey to gather information which would allow us to compare the involvement of union and
public pension funds in the proxy process. As we developed the first
survey, we began to wonder if pension funds that delegate proxy
voting authority to investment managers are limited by the inability of
their investment managers to vote proxies in accordance with specific
guidelines. We suspected that some investment managers are not
capable of, or interested in, complying with the Department of
Labor's mandate to vote proxies on issues which have an impact on
the economic value of plan-held stock.4 We developed a second survey to determine how investment managers vote proxies on behalf of
their pension fund clients. In particular, we sought information as to
how often pension fund clients direct investment managers to vote
proxies in a particular manner, and the extent of the managers' ability
to respond to the increasing involvement of pension funds in the
proxy process.
As we prepared the second survey, related questions surfaced.
1. See appendices A-E for copies of the surveys.
2. In a previous article, I discussed ERISA and SEC requirements with respect to proxy
voting. See Jayne Zanglein, Pensions, Proxies and Power: Recent Developments in the Use of
Proxy Voting to Influence Corporate Governance, 7 LAB. LAW. 771 (1991).
3. My perceptions are influenced by my prior experience as a union-side labor attorney
who primarily represented Taft-Hartley Funds.
4. See Letter from U.S. Department of Labor to Mr. Helmuth Fandl, Chairman of the
Retirement Board of Avon Products, Inc., at 3 (Feb. 23, 1988) [hereinafter Avon Letter], reprinted in 15 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 391 (Feb. 29, 1988).
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For example, what do corporate directors think about the increasing
involvement of institutional investors in corporate governance? We
designed a third survey to obtain information on how often corporate
directors communicate with institutional investors, and what role, if
any, directors believe that institutional investors should have with
regard to corporate governance.
The survey on proxy voting guidelines was an offshoot of the
surveys of pension fund trustees and investment managers. Our survey
experts advised us to keep the surveys self-contained so that respondents were not required to enclose other documents with the survey.
Consequently, we developed an independent one-page survey to find
out which funds invest in stock and to obtain proxy voting guidelines
of the trustees and investment managers we surveyed.
METHODOLOGY AND RESPONSE RATES

The first survey is the corporate director survey. We sent this
survey to two randomly selected directors at each of the publicly-held
Fortune 250 companies. We received responses from directors at 19%
of the companies surveyed. 5 Fifty-three percent are inside directors
and 47% are outside directors.6 The median time served as a director
is 12.25 years.7
The second survey had an excellent response rate. We sent surveys to the one hundred largest public pension funds that invest in
corporate stock.' We received responses from 47% of the public
pension funds. Surveys were also sent to the one hundred largest
union pension funds that invest in corporate stock.9 The union funds
were less responsive to the survey and we received responses from
13% of the union funds.
Sixty pension funds responded to the survey. Seventy-eight per-

5. Four non-directors completed the survey. We did not count these surveys in the
statistics but included anecdotes where appropriate.
6. Survey Of Corporate Directors On Institutional Investors And Corporate Governance
Q 2 [hereinafter Director Survey].
7. Director Survey Q 1.
8. This list was compiled from the Pension & Investments directory of the largest
funds. See Top 200 Pension Funds/Sponsors, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Jan. 20, 1992, at 20;
Ranking of Funds/Sponsors 201-1000, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Jan. 20, 1992, at 22.
Through our proxy voting guideline survey, we were able to weed out the funds that do not
invest in stock.
9. This list also was compiled from the Pensions & Investments directory of the largest

funds. See id.
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cent of the respondents were public funds, 6% were international
unions, and 15% were local unions." Approximately 95% of the
respondents maintain defined benefit plans and the rest maintain defined contribution plans." All of1 2 the respondent funds have pension
assets in excess of $300 million.
The third survey was sent to 212 investment managers.1 3 The
selection of investment managers was tied to the union and public
pension funds surveyed. We selected investment managers who fit
two criteria: 1) the investment manager has at least one of the union
or public pension funds surveyed as clients and 2) the investment
manager is one of the largest 250 managers, as reported in the Pensions & Investments 1991 directory of managers. Eighteen percent of
the investment managers responded to the survey.
The investment managers who responded to the survey manage
an average of $3.78 billion of equity portfolios on behalf of more
than 4150 pension fund clients. 4 These investment managers collectively manage $51.39 billion for corporate pension funds, $28.64
billion for government pension funds, $6.18 billion for union pension
funds, $4.55 billion for foundations, and $920 million for other types
5
of funds.'
The last survey was designed to collect proxy voting guidelines
from the same union funds, public funds, and investment managers
that received the other surveys. Twenty-eight percent of the public
funds sent proxy voting guidelines, only 5% of the union funds provided guidelines, and 62% of the investment managers sent us their
voting guidelines.
The surveys are reproduced as appendices to this article.

10. Proxy Voting Survey For Pension Trustees Q 1 [hereinafter Pension Survey].
11. Pension Survey Q 2. Of those public funds answering this question, 7% sponsor
defined benefit plans exclusively, 86% maintain defined contribution plans exclusively, and
7% sponsor both. Of the union funds, 85% maintain defined benefit plans exclusively, while
15% sponsor both defined benefit and defined contribution plans.
12. Pension Survey Q 3.
13. This list was compiled from Pensions & Investments 1991 directory of money manSTmENs,
May 20, 1991.
agers. See Who Manages the Most Money?, PENSIONS & INv
14. Survey Of Investment Managers On Proxy Voting And Corporate Governance Q 1
and Q 6 [hereinafter Investment Manager Survey].
15. Investment Manager Survey Q 2.
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II.

SURVEY RESULTS

WHAT PERCENTAGE OF ASSETS Do PENSION FUNDS

ALLOCATE TO STOCK?

Typically, defined benefit plans invest more assets in stock than
defined contribution plans.16 For example, in 1990, defined benefit
public funds invested 36.7% of. plan assets in stock, while public
defined contribution plans invested only 15.6% of plan assets in
stock.17 Union defined benefit plans invested 37.3% in stocks in
1990, while union defined contribution plans invested only 14.7% of
Defined contribution plans are typically more
assets in equities.
risk-adverse, in part, because plan sponsors do not want participants
to notice a decline in their individual accounts when they receive
their annual statement of accrued benefits. Because employer contributions can be reduced if investment performance exceeds actuarial
projections, defined benefit plans generally accept more risk.
The pension funds that responded to our survey invested an
average of 43% in stock as of December 31, 1991.19 Public funds
invest an average of 42% of plan assets in stock, while union funds
invest about 37% of assets in stock.2" Defined contribution plans invest 39% of plan assets in stock in contrast with the 43% that defined benefit plans invest in stock.2 1
How CONCENTRATED IS THE OWNERSHIP OF CORPORATE STOCK?

Pension funds own about 25 percent of the stock of U.S. public
corporations.2 2 The Department of Labor predicts that by the turn of

16. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, CURRENT PENSION INVESTMENT ISSUES,
EBRI ISSUE BRIEF No. 101, Apr. 1990, at 5. See generally Peter Drucker, Reckoning with
the Pension Fund Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 106, 109, 112 (defined
benefit plans adopt a short term approach); JAYNE ZANGLEIN, SOLELY IN OUR INTEREST:
CREATING MAXIMUM BENEFITS FOR WORKERS THROUGH PRUDENT PENSION INVESTMENTS
121-122 (1992); see also Lindley H. Clark, Jr., What Money Managers Really Sell, WALL ST.
J., July 2, 1992, at A8.
17. COLUMBIA INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR PROJECT, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CAPITAL MARKETS: 1991 UPDATE, at Table 17 (1991).
18. Id.
19. Pension Survey Q 4.
20. Most of the union funds that responded to our survey were building trades funds.
21. Pension Survey Q 4.
22. David M. Walker, Corporate Governance Issues and Their Fiduciary Implications,
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the century, pension funds will own approximately 40% of corporate
stock.' Taken together, all institutional investors24 (including pension funds), currently own about 50% of the stock of the largest U.S.
public corporations.' For example, institutional investors own 80%
or more of Chiquita Brands, Storage Technology and Owens-Coming
Fiberglass, and more than 75% of Deere, Gannett, Hercules, Whirlpool, Xerox, Armstrong World Industries, and Pitney Bowes.26
This ownership is oftentimes concentrated in the hands of only a
few investors. 27 In 1989, the twenty largest pension funds, with assets of $621.7 billion, controlled 7.7% of the stock of the top ten
corporations ranked by stock market value.2" The Columbia Institutional Investor Project predicts that by the year 2000, these top twenty funds could control between 22% and 29% of the equity in the top
ten corporations.29
Where corporate ownership is diffused, it is clearly harder for
shareholders to act in concert. T. Boone Pickens tells this tale:
A Fortune 500 chief executive officer once told me his dream was
to have a million shareholders, none of whom owned more than 100
shares. Hidden in his statement was the idea that the more dispersed
and fragmented the company's ownership, the more freedom he
would have to run the company as he - and only he - saw fit.
This adversity to accountability is at the root of the modem chief
executive officer's disdain for institutional investors.'

EMPLOYEE BENEFITS DIGEST (Int'l Found. of Empl. Benefit Plans), Vol. 26, No. 9, at 3
(Sept. 1989). See also Davis, Pension Funds and Financial Markets, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., Issue Brief, No. 91, at 6 (June 1989).
23. U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., PROXY PRoJEcT
REPORT, at 1 (1989).
24. Institutional investors include pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies,
bank-managed funds, and charitable and educational endowments. Approximately 38% of all
institutional investors are pension funds. COLUMBIA INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR PROJECT, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CAPITAL MARKETS: 1991 UPDATE, at Chart 1 (1991).
25. Id. at Table 19.
26. The Top 1000 U.S. Companies Ranked By Stock Market Value, BUS. WK., 1992
Special Bonus Issue, at 118.
27. See generally Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 117, 132 (1988); see infra Appendix F.
28.

DR. CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO, COLUMBIA INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR PROJECT, THE

PIVOTAL ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN CAPITAL MARKETS: A SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH AT THE COLUMBIA INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR PROJECT, at 26 and Table 11
(1990).
29. Id. at 26.
30. T. Boone Pickens, Jr., Company Watchdogs; Institutions Push for Maximum Value,
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Pension funds are not this CEO's dream investors. One manager who
runs a $6.5 billion pension fund told us that his firm has "more influence than... [his] clients would have individually." 3 Another manager noted that "the more shares you own, the more important your
32
voice."
As the holdings of pension fund investors become more concentrated, it will be easier to informally effect corporate changes.3 3 The
question then becomes whether pension funds are, in fact, in a position to influence the long-term direction of the corporations whose
stock they hold. Or, have pension funds adopted such a short-term
approach that corporations won't seriously consider them as partners
for the long run?
ARE PENSION FUNDS LONG-TERM INVESTORS? SHOULD THEY BE?

Logically, this position of potential control should provide pension funds with incentive to take a long-term perspective. However,
many directors have criticized institutional investors for taking a
short-term approach. The former chairman of one of the big three
major auto makers once described these "so-called 'investors' [as]
nothing more than predators, opportunists, speculators, traders, arbitragers, scavengers, even black-mailers, whose focus is on nothing
more than trying to capitalize on the short-term.., profit to them,
regardless of the consequences" elsewhere.'
Fred Hartley, former chairman of Unocal Corporation, describes
short-termism:
Can you run America with a fairly large percentage of your investors being casino gamblers? That's the problem you've got with all
of your managers of your pension funds and foundation funds ....
You know they trade on a tenth of a point. They'll sell and buy

PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Oct. 31, 1988, at 64.

31. Survey #248 ("It is not unusual for us to be among the largest holders of [the]
companies in which we invest").
32. Survey #369.
33. This statement is made without consideration of SEC restrictions.
34. Louis Lowenstein, Index Investment Strategies and CorporateGovernance, at 1, paper
presented at the 1991 Annual Colloquium on Corporate Law and Social Policy at The University of Toledo College of Law (March 7, 1991), reprinted in THE EFFECT OF INDEX INVESTMENT POLICIES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1991) [hereinafter Lowenstein]. See generally MICHAEL T. JACOBS, SHORT-TERM AMERICA: THE CAUSES AND CURES OF OUR BUSINESS MYOPIA (1991); LoUIS LOWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET? (1988).
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your stock twice in one day. They have no wait, no holding periods, no taxes to pay..,

it's entirely fast buck.3"

Another chief executive officer complains, "A year from now, 70% of
my stockholders will have changed. On that basis, I put my customers, and my employees, way ahead of [institutional investors]."3 6
Some commentators blame institutional investors for
management's short-term focus on quarterly earnings. 7 According to
A. A. Sommer, Jr.:
Inevitably the short-term perspective of institutional investors breeds

similar perspectives in management. Realizing the tentativeness of
the ownership of large amounts of their company's stock, and sensitive to the market penalties accruing to short-term adverse performance, management perspective is necessarily foreshortened and the
maintenance of quarter-to-quarter earnings improvement becomes a
paramount goal.3

This complaint is not new. In 1976, Peter Drucker wrote that
American asset management today suffers from ... [an] "excess of
competition." It has become so competitive and so volatile that the
participants outdo each other in promising miracles to "beat the
market" . ... Pension funds cannot beat the market - they are the
market .... But because the ability of the asset managers to attract
pension fund business heavily depends on their promise to perform
such miracles, they tend to concentrate on short-term results: the

35. T. Boone Pickens, Jr., Professions of a Short-Terner, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June
1986, at 76.
36. Id.
37. Ira Millstein, Chair of Governor Cuomo's Task Force on Pension Investments, observes that
[i]t is corporate managers' perception that to raise stock prices and keep entrepreneurial bidders away, companies must utilize short-term solutions at the expense of
the long-term research and development, training of employees and reinvestment in
new and existing plants necessary for future growth and competitiveness. Whether
this perception is in fact correct is not terribly important; this perception seems to
be driving much short-term corporate decision-making. The point for us is that
pension funds seem all too willing to further this perception by quickly, and perhaps automatically, accepting immediate benefits and riskier higher yields to fuel
those immediate benefits.
J. Edward Fowler, Corporate Governance Issues in the Takeover Era, reprinted in OUR EcoNOuiC SYSTEM: ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 99, 122 (W. Lawson Taitte ed., 1990).
38. A. A. Sommer, Jr., Introduction to JAMS F. HOGG, THE PREDATOR AND THE
PREDATEE (National Legal Center for Public Interest) at viii (1988), reprinted in OUR EcoNOMIlC SYSTEM: ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 99, 121 (W. Lawson Taitte ed., 1990).
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next ninety days or, perhaps, the next swing in the stock market.
Yet, by definition, pensions are long-term. Pension fund management therefore requires long-term strategies for true performance. It
is an axiom proven countless times that a series of short-term tactics, no matter how brilliant, will never add up to a successful longterm strategy.3"
Pension funds don't need to focus on quarter-to-quarter earnings:
they are funding benefits that won't become due for decades. Federal
law requires pension funds to be funded over thirty or forty years.'
Because pension funds have long-term obligations, they are fully able
to adopt a long-term investment strategy.41 Consequently, certain
funds such as CREF have implemented a long-term investment strategy and describe themselves as "the quintessential long-term investors.

42

We asked two questions to find out whether the survey respondents perceive pension funds as long term investors. The first question is normative: "Do you believe that pension fund investors should
be long term investors?"43 The second question is "Do you believe
that pension fund investors are long term investors?"44
More respondents believe that pension funds should be long-term
investors than believe that pension funds are long-term investors.
Eighty-seven percent of public funds believe that pension funds
should be long-term investors, but only 79% of public funds believe
that pension funds are long-term investors. Seventy-four percent of investment managers believe that pension funds should be long-term
investors, yet the number drops precipitously to 37% who believe that

39. PETER F. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION: How PENSION FUND SOCIALuSM
CAME TO AMERICA 70-71 (1976).
40. ERISA § 302(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1082(b) (1988).
41. Michael Jacobs, author of Short-Term America writes:
One would expect these institutional investors to be the ideal long-term shareholders. Pension funds and insurance companies collect money that does not need to
be paid out for many years into the future. However, on average, these institutions
hold stocks for much shorter periods than individuals do.
MICHAEL JACOBS, SHORT-TERM AMERICA: THE CAUSES AND CURES OF OUR BUSINESS MYO-

PIA 42 (1991).
42. David Pauly, Wall Street's New Musclemen, NEWSWEEK, June 5, 1989, at 46.
43. Pension Survey Q 48; Investment Manager Survey Q 36; Director Survey Q 35. The
surveys' questions sometimes were worded slightly differently for the directors, investment
managers, and pension funds. For example, on this question we asked directors if institutional
investors should be long term investors. We will not point out these minor differences in
wording with respect to each question. Copies of the surveys are attached as appendices.
44. Pension Survey Q 49; Investment Manager Survey Q 37; Director Survey Q 36.
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pension funds are long-term investors. All of the union funds surveyed think pension funds should be long-term investors and 92%
believe that pension funds are long-term investors. The gap was even
greater for corporate directors: 71% of directors believe institutional
investors should be long-term investors and only 11% believe that
institutional holders invest for the long-term.45

CHART 1
120

PERCENTAGES

100 1-..... ... ..

80 -

.................

60 -

40 1-"

20 -'

Public Funds

Union Funds

Inv Mgrs

Corp Dirs

RESPONDENTS
1

Believe PF Should Be

MBelieve PF Are

Do you believe that pension funds should be long-term investors?
Do you believe that pension funds are long-term investors?

45.

One director noted that institutional investors cannot be long-term investors "given

our current legal/finance system [and] statutes." Survey #100386.
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One public fund described "the long term vs. short term question" as "silly": "everyone is a long term investor until things
change." ' 6 Another public fund noted that whether pension funds are
long term
investors "depends on their funding and cash flow
7
needs.4

On the other hand, directors, who perhaps are in a better position
to observe institutional holders as they collectively invest, are less
likely to stereotype institutional investors as "short-term" or "long'4 One diterm." Many directors said that "some are; some aren't.
rector replied that it "varies with institutional group" 9 and another
clarified that pension funds generally are long term investors but
mutual funds usually are short-termers5 0 Another director proclaimed: "When push comes to shove . . .No! [Institutional investors
are not long-term investors. But] they will argue to the contrary.""1
One investment manager complained that there is "too much
emphasis on short-term (one-year) performance. ' 5 2 Others were more
ambivalent: "Some are [long-term investors], some aren't"5 3 or "We
are!"' but "No, for a more general response."5 5
We asked directors how corporations can encourage long-term
investment by institutional investors. 6 Many suggestions were made.
Most directors said that the board needs to earn the long-term commitment of institutional investors by "build[ing] a record of long-term
fine performance.,1 7 Other directors stressed communication: Corpo-

46. Survey #511.
47. Survey #530.
48. Survey #100476; see also Surveys #100227, 100113, 100085, 100212, and 100232.
49. Survey #100477.
50. Survey #100399.
51. Survey #100225.
52. Survey #230. One investment manager said that pension funds are "long term investors in [the] equity market, but not necessarily [long term] in a particular stock - investors
must try to maximize return, regardless of holding period." Survey #369.
53. Survey #257.
54. Survey #222.
55. Survey #397.
56. Director Survey Q 37.
57. Survey #100314; see also Surveys #100467 ("perform better"), 100137 ("by producing consistent superior results, paying good dividends and significant yield"), 100158 ("performance"), 100397 ("high ratio of earningsldividends/ROIs growth; i.e. earn it"), 100334 ("perform"), 100477 ("continue to regularly fund dividends"), 100311 ("by good long-term performance"), 100476 ("steady patterns of increases in profits and dividends"), 100261 ("performaned"), 100223 ("perform well and consistently over time, communicate."), 100257 ("by performing well"), 100227 ("consistent and well understood performance"), 100232 ("through
good performance"), 100270 ("steady and superior rate of return to shareholders"), and
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rations can encourage long-term investment by institutional investors
"by communicating [the] long-term strategies of the corporation.""8
For example: "[There should be a] frequent, no holds barred communication program covering issues in which institutional investors have
[a] particular interest."59 Another suggested: "Be very select in the
institutional investors that you pay attention to - keep them well informed."'" (In other words, keep shareholder activists like CalPERS
informed, so that the company is not placed on a "hit list" for shareholder proposals. As Dale Hanson, CalPERS' CEO, says: "Hell hath
no fury like an institutional investor scorned.") 6
Some directors were negative. One director said, "I don't think
[corporations] ... can" encourage long-term investment by institu-

tional investors. 62 An outside director said: "[You] can't! Investors
all investors must make their own timing decisions. Some will be
long term - some will not. Some will change their minds!" 3 Another director simply stated that "[this is] out of their sphere of influence."64 "[There's] little that a corporation can do as long as their
clients judge them on short-term performance. As one said to me
recently, 'It's a cruel world out there.' We're judged not only quarterly but [on] month to month performance."65
SHOULD PENSION FuNDs TAKE THE QUICK TAKEOVER BUCK?

Because a long-term investment approach generally seems at
odds with the decision to tender shares to make an easy dollar, we
asked pension funds under what circumstances they would tender

100349 (-sustained earnings growth-).
58. Survey #100363; see also Survey #100227 ("sound strategies, open communications,
consistent and well understood performance"), 100223 ("communicate well"), and 100315
('communicate plans for [the] future"). Other suggestions include "acting in [the] long-term
interest [of shareholders]" (Survey #100382) and "taking the initiative to create a community
of interest" (Survey #100399).
59. Survey #100036.
60. Survey #100212.
61. Interview with Dale Hanson, CEO of CaIPERS, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 6, 1991).
Hanson describes CaPERS as "the 'Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval'. If we speak out,"
they listen. Id.
62. Survey #100171; see also Survey #100502 ("Corporations should not [encourage
long-term investment], but public policy could.")
63. Survey #100445a.
64. Survey #100386.
65. Survey #100225.
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shares to a corporate raider.' Of the public funds, 4% said that they
would tender shares to a raider only if they were offered a substantial
premium, 42% said they would tender only if the premium was adequate, 2% would not tender under any circumstances, and 51% would
not tender if it was in the long-term economic best interest of the
plan participants not to tender. Several funds said that they left the
decision to tender to the investment manager.'
The loyalty of union funds to incumbent directors was surprising.
Union funds responded differently from public pension funds. Not one
of the union funds would tender the shares simply because they were
offered a substantial premium; 42% said that they would tender only
if the premium was adequate; 8% would not tender under any circumstances, and 42% would not tender if tendering was not in the
long-term economic best interests of the plan participants. One union
fund said that the decision needs to be made on a case-by-case basis,"' and another union fund said the trustees delegate these types
of issues to their money manager.6 9
We asked investment managers a similar question."° Nine percent of investment managers said they would tender shares only if
offered a substantial premium, 34% said they would only tender if
the premium was adequate, and 49% said they would not accept the
premium unless it was in the long-term interests of the plan participants to tender.7 '

66. Pension Survey Q 50.
67. Surveys #586, 540, and 559. The answers for this question (and other questions) do
not always total 100% because some respondents answered more than once and because we
did not report the number of respondents who answered "Other." Total responses can be
found in Chart 2.
68. Survey #479.
69. Survey #436.
70. Investment Manager Survey Q 38.
71. One investment manager clarified that "[t]he premium is only one of the issues we
review prior to deciding [on] a tender." Survey #248. Another investment manager clarified,
"We don't advise; we act because we have delegated responsibilities." Survey #351. Another
said, "Each case is unique." Survey #397.
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The willingness of pension funds and investment managers to
accept the fast takeover buck is surprising, given the fact that most
pension funds don't stand to net a profit from takeovers:
While a target's shares go up in a takeover, the acquirer's shares go
down, and institutional investors, who own both companies' common stock and usually their bonds as well, are left with no net
profit, even in the short term. The only way for them to enhance
value is through effective involvement in the affairs of the portfolio
companies they hold in virtual perpetuity.72
Apparently most pension funds haven't caught on to this concept
as they still rush to tender shares for a fast buck:
Antipathy toward raiders certainly does not come from investors.
Stockholders of target companies almost universally rush to accept
the premiums paid in takeovers. Some institutional investors favor
takeovers so much that they have banded together to pressure managements not to take certain actions that might stop or retard the
process. And individual investors have begun to organize, under the
leadership of T. Boone Pickens, to try to ensure that the rules aren't
changed to make takeovers harder to initiate.'
Possible reasons for this apparent contradiction will be examined
later.
DoEs INDEXING AFFECT AN INVESTOR'S ABILTY TO
INFLUENCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE?
Indexing has become a popular investment strategy.74 We found
that 81% of public funds invest in index funds while only 38% of
union funds index.75 Investment managers are less likely to invest in
index funds: 15% of investment managers index.
According to the Columbia Institutional Investor Project, in 1990,

72. Nell Minow, Playing Baseball in a Football Field: The Shareholder Perspective, at
1, (1991), reprinted in ABA SECTION OF BUSINESS LAW, THE CHANGING ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROCESS (April 12, 1991)

[hereinafter

MINOW].
73. Peter D. Goodson & Donald J. Gogel, Managing as if Shareholders Matter, HARV.
Bus. REV., May-June 1987, at 25.
74. See generally Lowenstein, supra note 34. "[l]ndexing is based on an 'if you don't
beat 'em, join 'em' mentality. Index funds effectively buy one of everything, guaranteeing
that they will do no worse and no better than average." JACOBS, supra note 41, at 54.
75. Pension Survey Q 42; Investment Manager Survey Q 32.
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15% of the assets of the largest 200 pension funds were invested in
equity index funds.76 Public funds are more heavily indexed than
union funds. On average, public funds index 41% of their stock portfolio while union funds index only 24% of their stock portfolio. Of
the investment managers who index, 61% of the assets they manage
are indexed.
Whether index funds can be good corporate owners has become
a hotly debated topic.' An investment manager with over one hun-,
dred pension fund clients told us: As an indexer, "[y]ou're not
'owning' a specific company for a reason. You're merely owning a
piece of the company 'by default.' Why would an owner of an index
fund have an interest?"78 A director put it more bluntly: "No
brainers = no value." 9 The director of proxy voting services at
Wells Fargo aptly describes the problem: "[S]ince we invest by formula, we vote by formula ....
80

[Voting proxies] is a production

job."
Where a pension fund invests in an index fund with hundreds of
corporations, it is impossible for the fund to effectively monitor every
corporation. CalPERS, for example, holds stock of more than 2,500
companies." DeWitt Bowman, the fund's chief investment officer,
hopes to substantially reduce the fund's stock holdings to 700 or 800
companies." Bowman explains that this reduction would permit
CalPERS "to do much more individual security analysis on the com-

76. COLUMBIA INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR PROJECT, INSTITUlONAL INVESTORS AND CAPITAL MARKETS: 1991 UPDATE, at Table 12 (1991).

77.

Lowenstein, supra note 34, at 13.
One commentator has noted:
Institutional investors trade intensively in index baskets of stock. No particular
company matters very much or for very long. Such investors have little or no
interest in using the power of voice to monitor management. It has not been in
the interest of any one holder of a trivial portion (though a large dollar value) of
a public company to spend a lot of energy and time prodding or reconstituting
boards when the benefits would accrue to free riders. As they say, they prefer the
power of exit: They vote with their feet.
Elmer W. Johnson, Ethics and Corporate Governance in the Age of Pension Fund Capitalism, reprinted in OUR ECONOMIC SYsM; ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

83-84 (W.

Lawson Taitte ed., 1990).
78. Survey #326.
79. Survey #100225.
80. Lowenstein, supra note 34, at 15.
81. James A. White, Pension Funds Think Less May be More, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23,
1991, at C1.
82. Id.
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panies themselves. 8 3 Dale Hanson of CalPERS says, "I hate indexing with a passion... I want to get rid of it.""
Louis Lowenstein describes another shortcoming of indexing:
Indexing... introduces a new reason for apathy. CalPERS, for
example owns about $250 million of GM stock, a tidy sum and one
worth protecting. But even large improvements at any one company
will have only trivial consequences in a portfolio of over 1,000
companies. It's like hitting only singles, with no one on base...
ever.8

Elmer Johnson, former inside counsel for GM, describes three
additional problems of indexing:
First, it is not in the interest of any one holder of a trivial portion
(however large the dollar value) of a public company to spend a lot
of time and energy monitoring management when most of the benefits will accrue to other people. Second, we have created a culture
that judges money managers on short-term performance - how well
they perform quarter by quarter against various indexes. Third,
professional investors are playing with other people's money, so
there is little incentive
to make long-term, company-specific invest8 6

ment decisions.

Most of the public funds we surveyed that index believe that
indexing does not affect the fund's ability to influence corporate
governance.8 7 Twenty-seven percent of public funds believe that indexing affects a fund's ability to influence corporate governance, 59%
think indexing does not affect a fund's ability to influence corporate
governance, and 14% are unsure. Surprisingly, one public fund said
that indexing "makes corporate governance more important" 8 "because it encourages us to be more proactive to defend the value of
our investment. " 9 Not one of the union funds believe that indexing
affects the fund's ability to influence corporate governance, 60%
believe that indexing has no effect, and 40% are unsure. Investment

83. Id.
84. Interview with Dale Hanson, CEO of CalPERS, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 6, 1991).
85. Lowenstein, supra note 34, at 16.
86. Elmer W. Johnson, An Insider's Call for Outside Direction, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.Apr. 1990, at 46.
87. Pension Survey Q 45.
88. Survey #500.
89. Survey #500a.
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managers were more ambivalent. Forty-one percent of investment
managers believe that indexing affects an investor's ability to influence corporate governance, 27% disagree, and 32% are not sure.9°
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90. Investment Manager Survey Q 33. One investment manager remarked that indexing
"negatively" affects an investor's ability to influence corporate governance. Survey #295.
Another said that it "[dlepends on [the] size of [the] fund and the clout it exercises.- Survey
#385.
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A public fund described one of the many problems with indexing: "Most directors do not have a large enough interest in the companies they oversee to really care about the company's performance." 91 The same public fund noted that the legal structure of
indexing creates additional obstacles: "Index fund advisors cannot
vote in accordance with clients' [directions] and guidelines. All investors have an indivisible share of the underlying securities. Shares
cannot be prorated by client ownership and then voted in accordance
with client guidelines. All shares are voted according to the money
manager's proxy voting guidelines." ' Another public fund disagreed:
"Our ability to influence corporate governance is a function of owning the shares, meeting with management, and expecting responsiveness to concerns. The 'form' of ownership, i.e. active investment
decisions vs. passive index, has not changed our focus."93
Finally, one investment manager clarified that:
Index fund managers lack input and knowledge to assess the issues
of the corporation. Much of the current dialogue on corporate governance today is misguided in that it is geared toward index fund
managers. Active managers, such as ourselves, have long-standing
records of trying to improve our clients' wealth through all legal
means at our disposal.'
We asked directors if they regard indexers differently from investors who actively select their stock for investment.95 Directors were
divided on this question: exactly fifty percent of corporate directors
regard indexers differently than active investment managers and the
other 50% do not regard indexers differently. In response to this
question, one director wrote: "Who wants to 'go to bed' with a computer or an index?, 96 Another director noted that "index investors
are not 'natural' buyers of [a] corporation's stock and are not necessarily aware of the issues and prospects of the corporation."'9 7

91. Survey #588.
92. Id.
93. Survey #509. Another fund commented: "We are activist shareholders through the
voting and [shareholder] proponent process." Survey #502.
94. Survey #222.
95. Director Survey Q 34.
96. Survey #100225.
97. Survey #100036. One director complained that indexers are indifferent to "corporate
business cycles." Survey #100235.
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IS THERE A CORRELATION BETWEEN TURNOVER RATES AND
PERCENTAGE OF INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP?
The average institutional investor holds stock for approximately
two years.9" Don Clark, CEO of Household International Inc., says:
"I don't think I've had any institutional investor talk about where we
are going to be five years from now ....
We want to meet with
them, want to hear their view[s], but the views we end up hearing
are all short-term.""
The Council of Institutional Investors recommends that investors
take a long-term perspective." The average turnover rate of institutional investors who are council members is less than forty percent
and holding periods exceed seven years ("longer than the average
executive holds a particular job"). 1
We found that the estimated average annual turnover rate for
stockholdings of all pension funds is 35%." °2 Public pension funds
have an average turnover rate of 33%, union funds have an average
turnover rate of 45%, and the mean turnover rate for investment
managers is 54%."13
The turnover rate for individual corporations varies widely. For

98.

Kevin G. Salwen & Joann S. Lublin, Giant Investors Flex Their Muscles More at

U.S. Corporations, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1992, at Al, A6. In Japan, institutional investors
hold stock an average of seven years. Id.
Pension fund turnover rates have steadily increased. Turnover rates rose from 39.5% in
1980 to 61.3% in 1986:
1980
39.5%
1981
51.9%
1982
56.4%
1983
60.2%
1984
57.1%
1985
63.2%
1986
61.3%
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TAX TREATMENT OF SHORT-TERM TRADING, at 14 (1990) [JCS-

8-90].
99. Salwan & Lublin, supra note 98.
100. Debate, Can Pension Funds Lead the Ownership Revolution? (remarks of Sarah A.
B. Teslik), HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1991, at 166, 167.
101. Id.
102. Pension Survey Q 5.
103. For additional information on turnover rates, see COLUMBIA INSTITrImONAL INVESTOR
PROJECT, REPORT TO THE BOARD OF ADVISORS - PENSION FUND TURNOVER AND TRADING
PATTERNs: A PILOT STUDY (1991); Memorandum from Ira M. Millstein and Carolyn Kay

Brancato to Board of Advisors, Columbia Institutional Investor Project regarding Interpretation
of the Results of the Pilot Study on Pension Fund Turnover (Jan. 11, 1990).
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example, of the Fortune 250, Quantum Chemical has the highest
turnover rate at 529.3% and Fina has the lowest rate at 2%. °4 We
examined corporate turnover rates to determine if there is a correlation between a corporation's turnover rate, the percentage of stock
held by institutional investors, and the number of institutional holders.
No correlation is obvious. Our tabulation is attached as an appendix.
Do THE INTERESTS Op INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS DIFFER
FROM DIREcToRs' INTERESTS?

We asked whether the interests of institutional investors differ
from the interests of the board of directors.' 5 The respondents who
believe that interests differ significantly include 35% of the public
funds, 46% of the union funds, 30% of investment managers, and
21% of corporate directors. Some respondents believe that the interests of institutional investors differ only slightly from the interests of
directors: 39% of public funds, 38% of union funds, 54% of investment managers, and 35% of corporate directors. The remainder believe that there is no difference in interests: 26% of public funds,
15% of union funds, 16% of investment managers, and 43% of corporate directors. Interestingly, 78% of the directors surveyed (who are
perhaps in the best position to observe the conduct of funds as well
as directors) believe that the interests of directors and institutional
investors differ slightly or not at all.

104. The Top 1000 U.S. Companies Ranked By Stock-Market Value, Bus. WK., 1992
Special Bonus Issue, at 118, 142, 148.
105. Director Survey Q 30; Investment Manager Survey Q 34; Pension Survey Q 46.
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One union fund responded that institutional investors focus on
stock price and performance, whereas "directors may have other priorities."'' "° Several pension funds noted that the "time horizons [of institutional investors and corporate directors] can be markedly different.""0 7 An equal number of pension trustees said that interests
should not differ.1" 8 One public fund noted that "in theory, there
should be no difference. However, in practice some directors seem to
be more interested in pleasing [the] CEO than in representing
shareholders."'" ° The same public fund also noted that although "directors are representatives of the owners (shareholders), their duty is
to the corporation."110
The responses of corporate directors varied. Many directors believe that institutional investors have a short-term perspective while
directors take a long-term view: "Institutions can vote with their feet.
Directors are locked in.""' "Institutional views [are] often shortterm rather than balanced or long term.""' 2 Another director was
emphatic: "They should not differ! I think institutional investors, like
other shareholders, can tend to have a shorter time horizon for performance than desirable and not weigh long term strategic
goalmaking as heavily in the performance equation as optimal."".
Another director refused to stereotype, saying "They could differ;
they don't automatically differ."" 4 Perhaps the following comment
most accurately reflects the view of a majority of the directors who
responded to the survey: "I don't differentiate between the kinds of
investors. One shareholder should have the same rights as any
115
other."
Investment managers responded to the same question. 116 One

106. Survey #479.
107. Surveys #529 and 597.
108. Surveys #503 and 589. Survey #502 responded that "they should not differ significantly, they should look to the long-term growth of the company."
109. Survey #500. Survey #511 noted that "most directors are appointed to provide for
management and not the owners.110. Survey #500.
111. Survey #100397.
112. Survey #100053; see also Survey #100171 (in which one director observed: "I think
they played a substantial role in the 'crazy 80s' [characterized by heavy trading and mergers
and acquisition activity] to the detriment of many constituencies".)
113. Survey #100445a; see also Survey #100113 (indicating that institutional investors
"often serve the short-term interests of shareholders".)
114. Survey #100257.
115. Survey #100232.
116. Investment Manager Survey Q 34.
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answered that the interests of institutional investors should not differ
from the interests of the board:
[The] board of directors is the shareholders' representative - but
investors can have different horizons than directors - some invest
for short-term while directors can and should look at longer term
goals for the company. That means they may make decisions [that]
affect stock adversely short-term, [but] that are in the best interests
of the company, long-term." 7
Another investment manager likened the relationship "to the relationship between taxpayers and politicians. Theoretically, the goal is the
same but the agenda sometimes differs.""' Another said: "Directors
frequently have their own agendas";119 "[It] depends on who [the]
representative is and what [the] pension fund's agenda is."'2 0 "In
many cases, the board is too complacent with existing manage121
ment."
Many respondents think that corporations would perform better if
pension fund representatives serve on the board of directors: 28% of
public funds, 23% of union funds, 18% of investment managers, but
only 7% of corporate directors predicted better corporate performance." Several directors commented on this question. One director said, "I believe that directors should not represent specific constituencies."'n Another said, "No question. [They would perform
worse.] Institutional investors are not investors. They are money managers/traders who do not have interests that are aligned to long term
shareholders." 2 4 Another commented: "[There is] no difference if
they are well chosen."'25 One investment manager said that "one
representative isn't going to make a huge difference."' 26

117. Survey #369; see also Survey #100386 (indicating that "institutional investors are not
investor interests, they are money manager interests. Director interests are shareholder interests"); see also Survey #284 (in which an investment manager stated that "for the most part,
[the interests of pension fund investors] are in line- with the interests of corporate directors);
see also Survey #364 (stating that interests "should not differ").
118. Survey #326.
119. Survey #230.
120. Survey #385.
121. Survey #259.
122. Director Survey Q 33; Pension Survey Q 47; Investment Manager Survey Q 35.
123. Survey #100036.
124. Survey #100386.
125. Survey #100133.
126. Survey #284.
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Many directors refused to regard institutional investors differently
than other investors. When asked if corporate performance would
improve if institutional investors were represented on the board, one
director replied, "I don't believe they bring any special skills not
obtainable [otherwise] with occasional meetings." 127 Another director
said: "I believe institutional investors are gate-keepers and traders.
Very few are good business [persons]. Very few have money on the
line. Our president has over $200 million on the line! He is interested
in value creation."128 Another director responded, "[It] depends on
the agenda of the institutional investor. All directors should have the
interests of all shareholders in mind all of the time. Institutional
investors are chosen for their stock picking talent, not management
talent."' 2 9 Another director agreed: "[it] is not possible to separate
institutional
[who are] "good" from "bad", "long term" vs.
"9130
"opportunist. investors
A lesser number of respondents surveyed believe performance
would suffer if pension fund representatives served on corporate
boards: 7% of public funds, none of the union funds, 15% of investment managers, and 15% of directors. Seventeen percent of public
funds thought performance would not change, as compared to 31% of
the union funds, 21% of investment managers, and 67% of corporate
directors who predicted no change. 3 '

127. Survey #100397.
128. Survey #100386.
129. Survey #100225.
130. Survey #100171.
131. Many respondents were unsure of the effect pension fund representation would have
on corporate performance: 48% of public funds, 46% of union funds, 46% of investment
managers, and 18% of corporate directors.
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We asked directors whether, during the nomination process, they
consider the relationship between a director nominee and institutional
investors. 132 Seventeen percent of corporate directors stated that their
board or nominating committee considers whether a prospective nominee has ties to institutional investors when nominating directors. Sixty-one percent reported that relations with institutional investors are
not considered when nominating directors, 5% said "sometimes", and
17% were unsure. Although one director said that the board has
asked institutional investors for nominations,'33 not one of the corporate directors reported that directors had been appointed at their
corporation at the request of institutional investors. Directors apparently sometimes consider the nominations of institutional directors,
but none of the directors who responded serves on a board where an
institutional representative was actually elected."3
Unlike directors, the pension funds and investment managers we
surveyed had direct experience with electing institutional representatives to serve on corporate boards. Nine percent of public pension
funds and 15% of union funds have representatives who serve on at
least one corporate board of directors.'
Thirty-six percent of investment managers reported that they have representatives who serve
on corporate boards.'36 One investment manager whose firm has
over one thousand pension fund clients said that his firm serves on
"hundreds" of boards. 37

132. Director Survey Q 29.
133. Survey #100399.
134. Director Survey Q 31; Survey #100399; see also interview with Dale Hanson, CEO
of CalPERS, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 6, 1991) (Hanson, CEO of CalPERS, said that nine
corporations have asked CalPERS for names of potential directors).
135. Pension Survey Q 38
136. Investment Manager Survey Q 27.
137. Survey #316; see also Survey #263 (in which one investment manager stated that his
firm serves on 8 boards); see also Survey #295 (indicating that another management firm sits
on 4 boards).
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According to a 1989 director survey by Egon Zehnder International, although one-third of directors agree that the interests of shareholders may not be effectively represented on corporate boards, only
twelve percent of corporate directors believe that institutional investors should be represented on corporate boards."' Roughly one-third
of directors disagree with the statement that "while pension fund
managers may wield a great deal of power because of the sheer size
of their funds, perhaps they [are] . . .not sufficiently knowledgeable
about the companies they invest in to serve as directors."13 9
The Egon Zehnder survey also asked corporate directors to describe the ideal composition of a board of directors. Directors said
that outside directors should be given more than two-thirds of the
seats; inside directors should hold less than a quarter of the seats, and
institutional investors should have less than one-tenth of the seats."4°
Thirty-three percent of the directors who responded to our survey
said that their board has a policy with respect to the ratio of inside to
outside directors. The policies vary. Approximately one-third of corporate boards have a policy of a majority of outside directors. 14 1 A
few directors reported that they only have one or two inside directors.1 42 According to a recent survey by SpencerStuart, the "median
ratio of outsiders to insiders currently is 3 to 1." 143 SpencerStuart
also reported that "[m]ore than a fourth of the Boards now have an
outside Director ratio of 5 to 1 or greater."'" We found that, on
average, most corporations maintain a ratio of outside directors to
inside directors of 3 to 1.14' Eighty-five percent of public funds and
46
38% of union funds favor a majority of independent directors.
One director favored a ratio of one outsider to five insiders. 147

138. Egon Zehnder Int'l., Behind Closed Doors: Unrest in the Ranks, CORP. IssuEs MONJan. 1989, at 2.
139. Id. The survey asked whether respondents agreed with the statement that "Pension
fund managers do not really know enough about the companies they invest in to serve as
directors." Id. 29% strongly agreed, 31% agreed somewhat, 24% disagreed somewhat, 5%
strongly disagreed and 1I% were not sure. Id. at 3.
140. Id. at 2.
141. Surveys #100158, 100085, 100113, 100311, 100223 and 100257.
142. Surveys #100397 and 100232.
143. SPENCERSTUART, SPENCERSTUART BOARD INDEx: 1991 PROXY REPORT at 3 (1991).
144. Id.
145. Director Survey Q 22, 23 and 24.
146. Pension Survey Q 25.
147. Survey #100232.
rTOR,
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WOULD SHAREHOLDER ADVISORY COMMITTEES BE HELPFUL?

A 1990 survey by Institutional Investor reported that 45% of
plan officials believe "that there should be shareholder advisory committees at corporations, or at least at those companies that are troubled."148 Only one of the corporations we surveyed has a shareholder advisory committee. 149 According to the Investor Responsibility
Research Corporation, very few corporations have established a formal
shareholder advisory committee.'5"
Most corporate directors we surveyed (79%) believe that it is
unlikely that a shareholder advisory committee will be established at
their corporation within the next year." Nine percent said it is possible that a shareholder advisory committee will be established.
Six percent of public pension funds surveyed had representatives
serving on a shareholder advisory committee.'52 None of the union
funds had representatives on shareholder advisory committees, 15 3 but
33% of investment managers serve on shareholder advisory commit54
tees.1

DOES ANYONE KNOW WHAT

THE AVON LETTER MEANS?

In the Avon Letter, the Department of Labor indicated that pen-

148. Speaking Out, INSnTITUTONAL INVESTOR, July 1990, at 203.
149. Director Survey Q 5.
150. Shareholders Promote Advisory Committees, 9 CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL. (IRRC)
No. 1, at 22 (Jan.-Feb. 1992). Avon has a shareholder advisory committee. Settlements
Reached Between Companies and Shareholders (as of April 1Z 1991), 8 CORP. GOVERNANCE
BULL. (IRRC) No. 2, at 6, 7 (Mar.-Apr. 1991). CalPERS withdrew its 1991 shareholder proposal when Sears agreed to meet with them twice in 1992 to discuss corporate performance.
Peg O'Hara, 22 Companies Adopt New Governance Proposals,8 CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL.
(IRRC) No. 1, at 15, 16 (Jan.-Feb. 1991). Ceridian (formerly Control Data) has agreed to
meet with its largest shareholders each July. Peg O'Hara, Informal Negotiations Yield Mixed
Results, 9 CoRP. GOVERNANCE BULL (IRRC) No. 4, at 17, 18 (July-Aug. 1992). Ryder System also has agreed to meet with shareholders. Settlements Reached Between Companies and
Shareholders in 1992, 9 CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL. IRRC) No. 4, at 20, 21 (July-Aug.
1992).
151. Director Survey Q 8.
152. Pension Survey Q 37.
153. Id.
154. Investment Manager Survey Q 26. We are unable to explain why this response rate
is so high, given the very small number of advisory committees at corporations. Perhaps
investment managers included participation in very informal committees, or perhaps the number of advisory committees is underreported.
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sion fund trustees must vote proxies on issues that have an economic
impact on plan-held stock.15 5 The Department gave two examples of
proxy issues that have an economic impact on plan-held stock:
reincorporation and poison pills. 56 In order to determine whether
those affected by the Avon Letter understand on what types of issues
they are required to vote, we listed 28 common proxy issues and
asked which of these issues usually have an impact on the economic
value of stock.1 57 The answers varied tremendously. Obviously, not
all of the respondents understood the rationale behind the question, as
one director refused to answer saying it was a "dumb question."'5 8
Most respondents believe that a contested election of directors
has an impact on stock value: directors (48%), investment managers
(73%), public funds (71%) and union funds (58%). There is a similar
consensus that an uncontested election does not have an impact on
stock value. 5 9 A majority of respondents believe that
recapitalization"W has an economic impact on stock prices: directors
(59%), investment managers (76%), public funds (95%) and union
funds (92%). Interestingly, these were the only two categories (contested elections and recapitalization) which a majority of all respondents believe have an economic impact on plan-held stock. Even the
two examples provided by the Department of Labor in the Avon
Letter (reincorporation and poison pills) did not receive a definitive
majority vote from all four groups of respondents. Twenty-six percent
of directors, 47% of investment managers, 63% of public funds, and
42% of union funds believe that reincorporation usually affects stock
value. Respondents also disagreed on whether a vote to redeem a poison pill or put a poison pill to shareholder vote has an impact on
stock price: 36% of directors believe it affects stock value, as do
77% of investment managers, 86% of public funds, and 75% of union
funds.
Public funds are more likely than any other group to believe that
proxy issues affect stock value. A majority of public funds think that
the following issues affect stock value: recapitalization (95%), golden
parachutes (86%), redemption of or vote on poison pills (86%), provi-

155. Avon Letter, supra note 4, at 3.
156. Id.
157. Director Survey Q 16; Pension Survey Q 29; Investment Manager Survey Q 28.
158. Survey #100386.
159. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text for statistics.
160. Recapitalization was described as an increase in authorized common stock, blank
check preferred stock, or in corporate debt.
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sions which opt out of Delaware law (81%), approval of executive
stock option plans (81%), supermajority voting requirements (79%),
independent directors (69%), contested elections of directors (71%),
dual class voting (72%), classified boards (72%), cumulative voting
(71%), preemptive rights (67%), targeted share placement (65%), restrictions on executive compensation (65%), shareholders' right to call
special meetings (63%), reincorporation (63%), independent compensation committees (56%), disclosure of executive compensation (56%),
and confidential voting (50%). Directors took the opposite approach
and said that only one category, recapitalization, affects stock price.
Of all of the issues we surveyed, there was only one category
that no groups believe had an impact on stock prices. A majority of
respondents believe that an uncontested election of directors does not
have an impact on the economic value of plan-held stock: directors
(86%), investment managers (84%), public funds (58%), and union
funds (58%). The union funds surveyed were more uncertain about
the effect of proxy issues on stock prices than any other group. Fifty
percent of union funds surveyed did not know if dual class voting
affects stock value. Forty-two percent of union funds did not know if
the following issues have an economic impact on stock prices:
reincorporation, board size, supermajority voting requirements, classified boards, shareholder advisory committees, targeted share placement, and independent compensation committees. Thirty-three percent
of the union funds did not know if uncontested election of directors,
independent directors, cumulative voting, minimum director stock
ownership, preemptive rights, provisions which opt out of Delaware
takeover laws, and independent nominating committees affect stock
value. But unions were not alone in this regard. More than 25% of
investment managers did not know if the following issues affect stock
price: confidential voting, classified boards, shareholder advisory committees, preemptive rights, director compensation, targeted share placement, independent compensation committee, independent nominating
committees, and provisions which limit director terms. More than
20% of directors did not know if contested election of directors,
supermajority voting requirements, confidential voting preemptive
rights, reincorporation, targeted share placement, and provisions which
limit the terms of directors affect stock prices.
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This data suggests that no one (perhaps not even the Department
of Labor) knows exactly what the Avon Letter means. This is especially discouraging since the Department of Labor specifically indicated in the Avon Letter that reincorporation and poison pills affect
stock value. The Chief Economist for the Securities and Exchange
Commission has also determined that poison pills,161 supermajority
voting requirements, 6 2 authorization of blank-check preferred
stock, 6 ' dual class voting, 6 4 greenmail,16
and classified
boards' 6 affect stock value. Other studies have concluded that the
number of independent directors at a corporation may affect stock
value."6 We are left to guess if other proxy issues affect stock prices. Some, such as golden parachutes, are seen as clearly affecting
stock value by everyone except the surveyed directors. 161 Others are
impossible to guess. If pension funds and their advisors are to comply

161. Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission, The Economics
of Poison Pills (Mar. 5, 1986), reprinted in Corporate Takeovers (Part 2): Hearings Before
the House Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the Comm.
of Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 690, 697-703 (1985). (explaining that the
adoption of poison pills typically results in an average net-of-market return of negative
1.42%).
162. Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission, Shark Repellents and Stock Prices: The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments Since 1980 (July 24, 1985),
reprinted in Corporate Takeovers (Part 2), id. at 604 [hereinafter Shark Repellents and Stock
Prices] (stating that the Chief Economist concluded that after the adoption of a supermajority
provision, stock prices typically decline by 1.25%). Id. at 661 (Table 4).
163. Id. at 661 (Table 4) (Issuance of blank-check preferred stock results in net-of-market
return of negative 2.84%).
164. See Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission, Update,
The Effects of Dual-Class Recapitalizations on Shareholder Wealth: Including Evidence from
1986 and 1987, at 8 (July 16, 1987).
165. Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission, The Impact of
Targeted Share Repurchases (Greenmail) on Stock Prices, reprinted in Corporate Takeovers
(Part 2), supra note 161, at 581 (explaining that although greenmail initially results in an
average net-of-market increase of 9.7% in the target's stock price, the announcement of the
greenmail causes a decline in stock price which exceeds the initial appreciation. Id. at 598).
166. Shark Repellants and Stock Prices, supra note 162, at 636 (stating that classified
board amendments typically result in a net-of-market return of negative 2.42%).
167. Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431,
440-442 (1988) (A corporate board with at least 60% independent directors is more likely to
fire a poorly performing CEO; stock value is affected positively when the CEO resigns);
Stuart Rosenstein & Jeffrey G. Wyatt, Outside Directors, Board Independence, and Shareholder Wealth, 26 J. FIN. ECON. 175 (1990) (noting that stock prices increase when additional
outside directors are appointed); see also discussion of these and other studies in Bernard S.
Black, The Value of Institutional Investors Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 895, 900-901 (1992).
168. Only 26% of directors believe that golden parachutes affect stock prices. Director
Survey Q 19.
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with the Avon Letter, more explicit direction is obviously needed.
Even more revealing was the response to the question "Do you
believe that ERISA requires trustees to vote proxies?" 169 Thirty-one
percent of union and 13% of public funds replied "no" although
ERISA, as clearly interpreted by the Department of Labor, requires
pension funds to vote proxies in accordance with the Avon Letter.7 '
Perhaps we should have asked whether trustees, or their delegates,
must vote proxies; however, it does not appear that union trustees
were misled by the question.'71 Many public funds noted that
ERISA does not govern the conduct of public funds. 72 Although
public funds are not bound by the Avon Letter, it is "widely accepted
as a standard by public funds."173
The Department of Labor has stated that a trustee who abstains
on a proxy issue which has an economic impact on plan-held stock
will violate ERISA's prudence rule. 74 We asked whether the trustees or their fiduciaries ever abstain on proxy issues.' 5 Two percent
of public pension funds, 8% of union funds, and 3% of investment
managers frequently abstain. Some abstain with respect to controversial or social issues: 18% of public funds, none of union funds, and
6% of investment managers. Others abstain with respect to de minimis issues: 4% of public funds, none of union funds and none of
investment managers. 7 6 One investment manager abstains "when
withholding [proxies] would prevent management from obtaining a
quorum." 17' Another
manager only abstains "for lack of sufficient
178
information."

169. Pension Survey Q 44.
170. Avon Letter, supra note 4.
171. For example, one union trustee marked "yes" and commented that it is "OK to delegate to [an] investment manager." Survey #496. Three funds noted this distinction and their
votes were counted as "Yes, ERISA does require trustees to vote."
172. Surveys # 586 and 502.
173. More Pension Funds Vote Their Own Proxies, Survey Finds, 17 Pens. Rep. (BNA)
100 (Jan. 8, 1990).
174. A fiduciary who "fails to vote, or casts a vote without considering the impact of the
question, or votes blindly with management," will violate the prudence rule. David G. Ball,
Where the Government Stands on Proxy Voting, 6 FIN. EXEcutivE INST., No. 4, at 31 (July
1990).
175. Pension Survey Q 23; Investment Manager Survey Q 45.
176. Fifty-four percent of union funds said they did not know whether the trustees ever
abstain on proxy issues.
177. Survey #248.
178. Survey #382.
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Table 1
Do the trustees (or their fiduciaries) ever abstain on proxy issues?
Check all applicable.
Public
Union
Investment
Funds
Funds
Managers
Don't Know
7%
54%
0%
Frequently
2%
8%
3%
Occasionally
20%
0%
12%
Rarely
27%
15%
41%
Yes, with respect
to controversial
or social issues
18%
0%
6%
Yes, with respect
to de minimis issues 4%
0%
0%
Never
18%
23%
35%
Other
7%
0%
3%

ARE PENSION FUNDS SPONSORING MORE SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS?

We asked whether institutional investors should have the right to
sponsor shareholder proposals in an effort to influence corporate governance.7 9 Eighty-five percent of public funds replied affirmatively,
69% of unions agreed, and 76% of corporate directors replied in the
affirmative. This is surprisingly low, given that institutional investors
already have the right to sponsor shareholder proposals.

179. Director Survey Q 10; Pension Survey Q 52. We did not ask investment managers
this question.
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Do you believe that institutional investors should have the
right to sponsor shareholder proposals in an effort to influence corporate governance?
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Of the corporate directors who responded to our survey, 40%
reported that institutional investors had sponsored a shareholder resolution at least once in the last five years.' ° Most directors reported
that institutional investors have frequently sponsored shareholder proposals at their corporation.1

CHART 9

RARELY
12.5

OCCASIONALLY
1
33.333

NEVER
25
FREQUENTLY
29.166

Number of corporate directors who report that institutional
investors have sponsored a shareholder resolution within the
last five years.

180. Director Survey Q 11. Fifty-two percent of directors said that no institutional investors have sponsored a shareholder proposal within the last five years and 7% are not sure.
181. Director Survey Q 12.
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We asked pension funds and investment managers whether they
have ever sponsored a shareholder proposal."8 2 Twenty-one percent
of public funds have sponsored a proposal. Not one of the union
funds has sponsored a shareholder proposal.
The Investor Responsibility Research Corporation has reported a
dramatic increase in shareholder proposals on corporate governance
issues over the last five years. 3 In the 1992 proxy season, the
number of shareholder proposals decreased, in part, because of
CalPERS' experiment in "quiet diplomacy." 4 The strategy has
been unproductive and CalPERS has retreated from its position.'
In light of CalPERS' experience, we asked if directors would be willing to meet with investors to negotiate settlements.8 6 Fifty-two percent of corporate directors expressed a willingness to meet with institutional investors who sponsor shareholder proposals to negotiate a
settlement. Five percent will not meet to negotiate,' 87 and 42% said
it depends on the proposal and the proponent.

182. Pension Survey Q 39.
183. Peg O'Hara, Early Shareholder Proposals Gain High Levels of Support, 9 CORP.
GOVERNANCE BULL. (IRRC), No. 2, at 1 (Mar.-Apr. 1992).
184. Id. The purpose of "quiet diplomacy" is to approach corporate directors quietly,
rather than bombarding them with shareholder proposals. As Dale Hanson put it: "You can
get more with honey than with vinegar . . . We're into our kinder, gentler phase." Interview
with Dale Hanson, CEO of CalPERS, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 6, 1991); see also Proposals
Considered by Shareholders Down 45 Percent in 1992, Statistics Show, 19 Pens. Rep. (BNA)
No. 24, at 999 (June 15, 1992); John Pound, After Takeovers, Quiet Diplomacy, WALL ST.
J., June 8, 1992, at A10.
185. Myron Magnet, Directors Wake Up!, FORTUNE, June 15, 1992, at 85; Proposals
Considered by Shareholders Down 45 Percent in 1992, supra note 184; Peg O'Hara,
CalPERS Halts 'Quiet Diplomacy' Efforts, 9 CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL (1RRC) No. 2, at 5
(Mar-Apr. 1992).
186. Director Survey Q 13.
187. Two respondents criticized the wording of the survey as too strong and suggested
"meet to resolve an issue" (Survey #100257) or meet "to discuss each other's positions"
(Survey #100225).
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CHART 10
YES
52.5

NO
5

DEPENDS
42.5

Corporate directors: Is your corporation willing to meet with
institutional investors who have sponsored shareholder proposals to negotiate a settlement?
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HAVE PENSION FUNDS ADOPTED PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES?

The Department of Labor has suggested that trustees or their
Yet, according to our
delegates adopt proxy voting guidelines.'
survey, only 89% of public funds have proxy voting guidelines, and
77% of union funds have adopted voting guidelines."8 9 Where the
fund employs external equity managers, public fund trustees report
that 69% have adopted guidelines, and 85% of union funds report
that their equity managers have adopted guidelines."t9 Ninety-seven
percent of all investment managers report that they have adopted
standard voting guidelines. 91
WHAT Do TnE PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES SAY?

We received proxy voting guidelines from 62 investment managers, 28 public funds, and 5 union funds. Twenty-eight percent of the
public funds we surveyed sent us a copy of their guidelines. Eighteen
percent of the public funds advised us that they have delegated proxy
voting authority to an investment manager, and 9% either said that

188. The Department of Labor has interpreted ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. §
1104 (a)(1)(D) (1988), to require maintenance of records with respect to the voting of individual proxies, the general voting procedure followed by the investment manager, and individual votes. Letter from U.S. Department of Labor to Robert A.G. Monks, President, Institutional Shareholders Services, Inc. (Jan. 23, 1990) reprinted in 17 Pens. Rep. (BNA) at 244
(Jan. 29, 1990) [hereinafter Monks Letter]. In the Avon Letter, the Department stated that
ERISA's prudence rule requires fiduciaries to record their voting decisions. Avon Letter, supra
note 4, at 5. Trustees and investment managers should adopt proxy voting guidelines. U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, PROXY PROJECT REPORT (1989) at 9.

189.
190.
191.
ed that

Pension Survey Q 9.
Pension Survey Q 10.
Investment Manager Survey Q 3. A 1989 survey by the Department of Labor report61% of investment managers have adopted formal voting procedures and actually fol-

lowed those procedures. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PROXY PROJECT REPORT, at 5 (1989). See
generally JAYNE ZANGLEIN, SOLELY IN OUR INTEREST: CREATING MAXIMUM BENEFITS FOR
WORKERS THROUGH PRUDENT PENSION INVESTMENTS at 76 (1992):
Written proxy guidelines are most common in corporate pension funds which manage plan assets in house and in large public pension plans. A 1987 survey of 334
corporate plan sponsors by the Employee Benefit Research Institute found that 43%
of corporate plans which manage funds internally had a written voting policy,
while only 21% of the externally managed funds had a policy. A 1988 survey by
Greenwich Associates found that 19% of public funds have voting policies and
16% discuss proxy votes during meetings. Twenty-eight percent of public funds
with assets of $1 billion have written policies, and only 16% discuss votes during
meetings.
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they had no guidelines or are in the process of drafting guidelines.
Four percent of the public funds surveyed do not invest in stock.
Although only 5% of the union funds provided proxy guidelines,
another 11% replied to the survey, noting that they had delegated
voting authority to their investment managers. Almost all of the
guidelines we collected require the proxy voter to vote for
management's slate of directors and to support management on routine issues. Conversely, the guidelines typically require the proxy
voter to vote against any management or shareholder proposal which
would frustrate takeover attempts or empower shareholders. An overwhelming number of proxy guidelines did not specifically address
many of the most common management and shareholder proposals.
Proxy voting guidelines vary tremendously in length and content.
Many guidelines are just one or two sentences: "We typically vote
with management except with regard to confidential voting and other
matters detrimental to shareholders." Others are meticulously detailed.
One set of proxy voting guidelines we received is 99 pages.
Given such disparity, it is difficult to summarize the content of
these proxy voting guidelines or to give representative examples. We
have listed the contents of the guidelines by issues in the appendix.
Many of the funds and investment managers described their
voting policies in ERISA language, incorporating either the prudence" or exclusive benefit rule 93 into instructions on how to
vote proxies. Twenty percent of the union funds and 27% of the
investment managers have adopted voting guidelines which use
ERISA terminology.
WHO VOTES PROXIES?
The board of trustees retains authority to vote proxies at 15% of
the public funds." Two percent of public funds have delegated
voting authority to an investment committee.19 Thirty-four percent
of public funds and all of union funds have delegated voting authority to external equity managers.196 Seventeen percent of public funds
vote proxies through in-house equity managers."7 Four percent of

192.
193.
194.

ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1988).
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1988).
Pension Survey Q 8.

195. Id.

196. Id.
197.

Id.
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public funds have delegated a portion of their proxy voting authority
to a custodian bank or master trustee. 98

Table 2
Who has responsibility for voting proxies with
stock portfolio? (Check all applicable).
Union
Board of Trustees
0%
0%
Investment Committee
External equity managers or
100%
investment advisors
0%
In-house equity manager(s)
Custodian bank/Master trustee 0%
0%
Other

respect to the fund's
Public
15%
2%
34%
17%
4%
34%

Do TRUSTEES AND INVESTMENT MANAGERS
FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES?

We asked trustees who have delegated voting authority if they
have ever instructed a proxy voter to vote contrary to the proxy voting guidelines." 9 Ten percent of public funds and none of the union
funds had so instructed a proxy voter.

198.
199.

Id.
Pension Survey Q 11; Investment Manager Survey Q 11.
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CHART 11
PERCENTAGES

80 I-

60 F-

40 I-

I-............................

20 t-

Freq'ly

Occas'ly

Rarely

Never

Not Sure

RESPONDENTS
I

PUBLIC FUNDS

A

UNION FUNDS

M] INVESTMENT MANAGERS

Have pension funds asked an investment manager to vote a
proxy contrary to the manager's proxy voting guidelines?
If so, how frequently?
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A few respondents reported that within the last year trustees had
formally disagreed at least once with a vote made by a proxy voter.2"° Only 4% of public funds and no union fund reported this type
of disagreement. Eleven percent of investment managers reported that
their clients had disagreed with a proxy-voting decision by their firm.
An investment manager said that his firm had once been requested to vote on a poison pill, contrary to voting guidelines.2"' Some
managers establish separate accounts to handle clients who want to
vote differently than the firm's investment guidelines:
We have four group trust accounts and two separate accounts which
are voted according to our guidelines. One separate account is voted
according to our client's guidelines. The one separate account with
their guidelines has a few issues that require votes contrary to our
own guidelines: [Issues such as] cumulative voting, classified
boards, increase in common stock, [and] redemption of poison
202
pills.
Several investment managers stressed that they were not criticized, but were questioned: "[It was] more of questioning why we
voted in a certain way" 0 3 and "some [clients] have questioned [the]
rationale for a particular vote."" ° Another said that when they were
questioned about their votes on executive compensation issues, "we
responded by explaining our policy in depth." ' 5

200. Pension Survey Q 15; Investment Manager Survey Q 15.
201. Survey #364. This investment manager also noted that despite any disagreements
over proxy voting issues, his firm still "votes based on our best judgments as to what is best
for beneficiaries." Id.
202. Survey #391.
203. Survey #259.
204. Survey #369.
205. Survey #382. Another investment manager told us that a pension fund client had

voiced disagreement with "corporate governance issues [when her] ...firm voted according
to [its] . . . guidelines." Survey #341.
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CHART 12
PERCENTAGES
120
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..........

4 0 . ......
.. ...... ........................

20
1-2

3-5

5-10

>10

Never

Not sure

RESPONDENTS
1
E

PUBLIC FUNDS

MUNION FUNDS

] INVESTMENT MANAGERS

Within the last two years, have the trustees formally disagreed with a vote made by a proxy voter? If yes, how
often within the last two years?
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We asked whether fund trustees had ever asked a proxy voter to
return proxies to the trustees to vote. 2 ° Although not one of the
public funds or union funds had reversed this delegation of proxy
voting authority, 19% of investment managers reported that this had
occurred in the funds they managed. One investment manager has a
client that is considering whether to ask the manager to return the
proxies to the trustees.2 7 Another investment firm reported that it
was asked to return proxies when "we disagreed with [the fund's]
voting policy." 20 8 One investment manager told us that his firm will
return proxies upon the request of pension fund clients "who reserve
the right to vote" their proxies."°

Table 3
Have the fund's trustees ever asked a proxy voter to return proxies to
the trustees to vote?
Public
Union
Investment
Funds
Funds
Managers
Yes
0%
0%
19%
No
95%
100%
67%
Not sure
5%
0%
14%

In response to the question, "Has a proxy voter ever refused to vote
proxies according to the fund's proxy voting guidelines?", 90% of
public funds and 92% of union funds responded that this had not
occurred.2 10 One investment manager expressed its unwillingness to
cater to a client's special interests: "If they want [to] vote proxies,
they can by not delegating; they cannot do so on a spot basis. 2..
No public funds have fired a proxy voter who refused to vote a

206. Pension Survey Q 17; Investment Manager Survey Q 17. The Department of Labor
has stated that "to the extent that anyone purports to direct an investment manager as to the
voting of proxies, . . . the manager would not be relieved of its own responsibilities and
related liabilities merely because it . .. follows the direction of some other person ...
Avon Letter, supra note 4, at 5.
207. Survey #382.
208. Survey #295. Another respondent clarified that his firm had been asked to return
proxies to the fund to vote, but only prior to the Department of Labor's ruling in the Avon
Letter. Survey #364.
209. Survey #311.
210. Pension Survey Q 18.
211. Survey #222.
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proxy according to trustees' directions.212 Nor has any union fund
fired an investment manager for refusing to follow instructions.213
These results are surprising for three reasons. First, anecdotal
evidence suggests that this occurs with some frequency.214 Second, a
1987 report by the Investor Responsibility Research Center concluded
that "[i]nstitutional investors, a potential check on corporate management, face serious conflicts of interest in voting, and many institutions have succumbed to management pressures to support voting
215
proposals that are not in the shareholders' interests.
Third, according to a recent survey by Greenwich Associates,
during 1991 large corporate and public pension funds and foundations
216
terminated almost one thousand investment management firms.
This is a fifteen percent increase from the previous year.217 Most
plans (58%) terminated investment management firms for poor performance, while 42% cited the loss of key managers at the firm as the
reason for termination. In addition, 39% fired firms because they
failed to adapt investments to the fund's specific goals.21 In response to our survey, only one investment manager reported that his
firm had been fired because a manager had refused to vote proxies as
directed by the pension fund.2 19 Perhaps the results are lower than
expected because pension funds refused to state whether they had
fired an investment manager. Perhaps investment managers who were
fired simply refused to disclose this fact. We are more inclined to
believe that a controversial proxy vote is just one of several reasons
the manager is fired, and that trustees and investment managers have
a selective memory when it comes to the reason the manager was
fired.

212. Pension Survey Q 19.
213. Id.
214. In my experience as fund counsel, I have often observed occasions when trustees
have challenged or criticized an investment manager's decision.
215. Marcia Parker, Proxy Battles Heating Up; More Chief Executives Join Letter-Writing
Campaign, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Apr. 6, 1987, at 1.
216. Increasing Number of Funds Dissatisfied with Investment Managers, 19 Pens. Rep.
(BNA) at 761 (May 4, 1992).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Survey #311.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

61

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 2
[Vol. 10:I

Hofstra Labor Law Journal

Is MANAGEMENT SOLICITATION IMPROPER?

We asked directors whether management solicits the votes of
institutional investors.220 Thirty-seven percent responded that solicitation occurs frequently, 24% said occasionally, 20% said rarely, and
20% of corporate directors said that the votes of institutional investors
are never solicited.
According to our survey, votes are most often solicited for the
election of directors,"
proxy issues,2"
takeovers,223 major
2
24
2
226
strategy changes,
poison pills, " mergers,
social issues,227
8
229
option plans,'
compensation
issues,
staggered
boards, 230 and
231
'
''232
"any and all issues"

"just to get the vote out.

Pension funds and investment managers reported different experiences with management solicitation. Public funds have encountered
solicitation frequently (15%), occasionally (35%), rarely (37%), and
never (4%).233 Eight percent of union funds reported frequent solicitation, 46% reported occasional solicitation, 15% responded that solicitation rarely occurs, and 15% said that solicitation never occurs. 234 Investment managers reported that solicitation occurs fre-

quently (11%), occasionally (60%), rarely (26%), and never (3%).235
According to investment managers, the most common types of issues
solicited are corporate governance issues,2 36 tender offers,237
reorganizations, 23
220.
221.
222.
500.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

stock

option

plans,239

contested

elections, 24 0

Director Survey Q 14.
Surveys #100314, 547, and 500.
Surveys #100314, 100382, 100387, 100477, 100223, 100257, 100270, 503, 502, and
Surveys #100334, 100053, 100311, 100315, 527, 536, 505, 558, 579, 528, and 500.
Survey #100334.
Surveys #100311 and 507.
Surveys #100387, 100349, 536, 538, 576, and 500.
Surveys #507, 503, 502, and 100315.

228.

Surveys #509, 502, 522 and 100212.

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Survey #100036.
Survey #100133.
Surveys #100225, 501, and 542.
Survey #100476.
Pension Survey Q 20.

234.

Id.

235.
236.
237.
238.

Investment Manager Survey Q 42.
Surveys #369 and 341.
Surveys #316 and 341.
Id.
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mergers, 24' board composition,24 reincorporation and increase of
authorized shares,243 and executive compensation.244 Oie investment manager told us that her firm is occasionally solicited "when
the vote is expected to be close."2 45 Another manager replied that
his firm is frequently solicited on "virtually all material proposals."24 Dale Hanson, chief executive of CaIPERS, has testified before Congress that an investor relations staff person once told him
that he "had to call some shareholders two or three times to convince
shareholders to see it [the corporation's] . . . way" and get them to

change their votes. 247 Hanson reports that CalPERS has experienced

"considerable pressure ... [as] a state agency with firmly established

voting guidelines, as well as reporting responsibilities to our Board;
we are not particularly vulnerable to this type of pressure. But if we
are encountering the pressure, you can surely expect that other investors -

investors that are not as insulated as are we 249

are also being

pressured."
We asked trustees and investment managers whether they ever
had been resolicited to change a proxy vote that already had been
cast on behalf of a pension fund client.2 " The survey respondents
reported that they are not frequently resolicited. Only 2% of public
funds, none of the union funds, and 3% of investment managers had
been frequently resolicited to change a vote that already had been
cast. More respondents were occasionally resolicited: public funds
(20%), union funds (0%), and investment managers (21%). Eleven
percent of corporate directors admit that they occasionally resolicit
votes.250

A corporate director indicated that management will attempt to
change a vote "only when an institution directly advises [the] compa-

239.
240.
241.
242.

Survey #339.
Surveys #325, 391, and 257.
Survey #391.
Id.

243.

Survey #294.

244. Survey #257.
245. Survey #295.
246. Survey #248.
247. Corporate Proxy Voting System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and
Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1989) (testimony of Dale Hanson, CEO, CalPERS).
248. Id.
249. Pension Survey Q 21; Investment Manager Survey Q 43.
250. Director Survey Q 15.
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ny that they voted against management proposals regarding charter
amendments and/or compensation benefit plans." ' ' Several investment managers reported that they have experienced improper solicitation. 2 One investment manager said, "There should be no solicitation to change votes." 3 Another said "I do not think management
In contrast, an investment manager with over one
should solicit."
thousand pension fund clients, who manages over five billion dollars
in assets
said that he had not experienced any improper solicita255
tion.

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
solicitor

Survey #100036.
Surveys #339 and 341.
Survey #341.
Survey #257.
In particular, he said, "We are very large - [the risk of] exposure to [the proxy]
would be high (risk of publicity)." Survey #316.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol10/iss1/2

64

Zanglein: Who's Minding Your Business? Preliminary Observations on Data and
Who's Minding Your Business?

1992]

CHART 13
PERCENTAGES

Freq'ly

Occas'ly
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Not Sure

Never

SOLICITATION AND RESOLICITATION
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F

IM-RE
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Does management solicit the votes of institutional investors?
Does management resolicit institutional investors to request
them to change a proxy vote?
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Improper and coercive management solicitation has been the
focus of Congressional hearings. One lawyer who has served as a
corporate director testified before Congress that:
Management has a lot of leverage. They can threaten to withdraw
pension funds from any fund manager that dares to oppose
[them] ... I know of cases where hundreds of millions of dollars
have been taken away from fund managers who have voted against
management proposals ......
Yet only a small number of respondents reported that they consider
some management solicitation improper." Eight percent of public
funds, 0% of union funds, and 6% of investment managers consider
some of the solicitation improper.
Several public pension funds complained of improper management solicitation. One fund said that management had threatened to
call the governor over a contested proxy vote.258 Another management group threatened "not to build a factory in [the fund's] state"
unless the fund voted for management. 259 Another fund told us that
if they didn't vote for management the first time, "a second proxy
may show up or a call may come inquiring about returning [the]
proxy.

256.

' 26 0

Corporate Proxy Voting System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and

Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1989) (statement of Roderick M. Hills).
257. Pension Survey Q 22; Investment Manager Survey Q 44.
258. Survey #511. See also Survey #502: "A company lobbied us heavily to vote against
a shareholder proposal."

259.
260.

Survey #511.
Survey #538.
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Do you believe that any management solicitation has been improper?
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We also asked investment managers if they had ever simultaneously represented a corporation and a pension fund client which intended to vote its proxies against that corporation's management.26
Only 21% of investment managers reported that this occurs occasionally and 12% said it occurred rarely. Surprisingly, 68% of investment
managers said this never occurred.2 62 Eighteen percent of investment
managers believe that this simultaneous representation had placed
them in a conflict of interest.263 A pragmatic manager commented
"[there's] no conflict if no pressure is applied."' 64 Only one investment manager specifically stated that simultaneous representation
"exposes the firn to business risk - certainly an implied conflict of
'
interest exists."26

Table 4
Has your firm ever simultaneously represented a corporation and a
pension fund client which intended to vote its proxies against that
corporation's management?
Frequently
Occasionally
Rarely
Never

0%
20%
12%
68%

If so, do you feel this placed your firm in a conflict of interest?
Yes
No
Not sure

18%
45%
27%

According to a 1987 survey by the Employee Benefit Research
Institute, 65% of pension fund investment managers "have felt pressure to direct their proxy votes in favor of corporate management."'
Three percent of investment managers were frequently

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Investment Manager Survey Q 39.
None of the investment managers told us it occurs frequently.
Investment Manager Survey Q 40.
Survey #222.
Survey #382.
Marcia Parker, The Proxy Pressure's on; Managers Admit to More than Fund Execs,
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pressured, 25% were sometimes pressured, 38% rarely experienced
pressure, and 34% never were pressured.2" Investment managers
were more likely to experience pressure than plan sponsors. 26' EBRI
noted that "[b]ecause the experience of financial pressure may be a
sensitive topic for some plan sponsors, its occurrence may not be
recorded as accurately as other survey information .... Some sponany unwanted pressure, while others
sors may be anxious to reveal 269
occurrence."
its
hide
to
try
may
We asked investment managers for suggestions on ways to avoid
these types of conflicts of interest.27 Most suggested that confidential voting would prevent such conflicts.271 Other methods used by
investment managers to avoid conflicts include: abstaining,272 allowing beneficiaries to cast the votes,273 and having a written policy
that clients "agree to accept". 274 An investment manager with over
one thousand pension fund clients was more realistic: "[This] requires
limiting
what clients we will accept - [it's] not economically practi275
cal."
Several investment managers invoked the language of ERISA, as
if it were a shield which would protect them from conflicts of interest. For example, one manager said, "We vote proxies only in the
best interests of the plan participants." 276 Another said, "The law is
clear as to how we decide: in the interest of the plan beneficiaries."2' Another investment manager expressed some ambivalence;
he was not sure if simultaneous representation placed his firm in a
conflict of interest, but recited the familiar litany: "[We] have to vote
to benefit [the] beneficiaries."'278 Another manager said that dual

PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Sept. 21, 1987, at 3 [hereinafter Parker].
267. Id.
268. Proxy Voting Occurs in Most Funds, But Increases with Equity Assets, EBPJ Says,
14 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 1271 (Sept. 21, 1987).
269. Parker, supra note 266.
270. Investment Manager Survey Q 41.
271. Surveys #369, 382, and 211.
272. Survey #325.
273. Survey #341.
274. Survey #364. "Pension fund client should have [a] clear provision in [the] policy as
to who votes proxies." Survey #288. Another suggestion: set up a "Chinese wall" within the
firm. Survey #345.
275. Survey #316.
276. Survey #339.
277. Survey #341.
278. Survey #364; see also #288 ("[We] represent plan participants").
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representation has never placed his firm in a conflict of interest because the finm's proxy voting "guidelines are according to issues not
27 9
manager preference."

Although ERISA does not require trustees or their investment
managers to take the quick takeover buck, '0 or maximize shortterm profits,28 ' it appears that many trustees and investment managers mistakenly believe that ERISA requires them to maximize shortterm returns. One commentator has observed:
One of the reasons these [investment] managers are motivated to
take short-term profits by tendering stock into tender offers, and to
vote against antitakeover defense mechanisms presented at shareholder meetings, is what they perceive to be the constraints of a
fiduciary or statutory duty, owed to the pension fund beneficiaries,
always to maximize current investment results and take advantage of
immediate profit-making opportunities. 2
Trustees and investment managers need to be educated on the Department of Labor's position on proxy voting, as outlined in the Joint
Statement of Pension Investments issued by the Department of Labor
and the Department of the Treasury.28 3
Do INVEsTmENT MANAGERS KEEP PROXY VOTING RECORDS?
The Department of Labor requires trustees to keep records of
their proxy voting activity.2u In 1989, the Department of Labor
found that almost 40% of investment managers surveyed did not keep
proxy voting records. 2 5 A 1991 survey by Greenwich Associates

279. Survey #391.
280. Joint Dep't of Labor/Dep't of Treasury Statement of Pension Investments, Jan. 31,
1989, 16 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 215 (Feb. 6, 1989).
281. See infra note 471 and accompanying texL
282. J. Edward Fowler, Corporate Governance Issues in the Takeover Era, reprinted in
OUR ECONOMIC SYSTEM: ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 120 (W. Lawson Taitte ed.,
1990).
283. Joint Dep't of Labor/Dep't of Treasury Statement of Pension Investments, Jan. 31,
1989, supra note 280; see also infra note 471 and accompanying text.
284. Labor Department Opinion Letter on Proxy Voting, 17 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 244, 245-6
(Jan. 29, 1990); Avon Letter, supra note 4, at 5.
285. Joel Chernoff, Washington Working to Change System, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT
AGE, Apr. 16, 1990, at 19. In its proxy project report, the Department of Labor noted that,
"Inone case, an investment manager did not know whether it had voted the proxies in question because no records were kept on proxy voting." U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PROXY PROJECT
REPORT, at 7 (1989).
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reported that 23% of pension funds criticized their investment managers because they had failed to send documentation to trustees for
review in advance of fund meetings.286 Seventeen percent of plan
sponsors said they were dissatisfied with investment managers because
their reports to the trustees were too superficial." 7 The Greenwich
Associates survey "found that, on average, funds meet three times a
year with their most important investment managers. '2 8
We asked trustees and investment managers about their voting
records. Fifteen percent of equity managers typically make presentations to the trustees at every meeting of public and union funds.8 9
Most proxy voters report to the trustees through written and oral
2
reports. 90

Table 5
How do proxy voters report to the trustees on proxy voting? (Check
all applicable).
Public Union Investment
Funds Funds Managers
92%
89%
reports
70%
Through written
Through oral reports at
31%
26%
38%
fund meetings
Through discussion outside
8%
11%
4%
of fund meetings
Our proxy voters do not
provide proxy voting
0%
14%
17%
reports
Most union funds meet monthly or as needed. 91 Most public
funds meet monthly.2" Proxy voters typically report to union trustees on proxy voting quarterly or annually and report to public funds

annually.

293

286. Increasing Number of Funds Dissatisfied with Investment Mangers, 19 Pens. Rep.
(BNA) No. 18, at 761 (May 4, 1992).
287.

Id.

288. Id.
289. Pension Survey Q 7; Investment Manager Survey Q 14. Responses to this question
varied too greatly to extrapolate a typical response.
290. Pension Survey Q 13; Investment Manager Survey Q 13.
291. Pension Survey Q 6.
292. Id.
293. Pension Survey Q 14; Investment Manager Survey Q 14.
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Table 6
How often do proxy voters report to the trustees on proxy voting?

Monthly
Quarterly
Every 6 months
Annually
On request

Public
Funds
11%
23%
9%
36%
32%

Union
Funds
8%
33%
17%
42%
25%

Investment
Managers
3%
32%
15%
35%
56%

The Department of Labor has stated that trustees, or their investment managers, must match proxies to all record holders as of the
record date and vote in accordance with the plan's voting procedure.294 We found that 70% of investment managers match proxies,
8% cannot match, and 22% do not attempt to match.295

294.
295.

Labor Department Letter on Proxy Voting, supra note 284, at 245.
Investment Manager Survey Q 4.
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CHART 15

YES
70.27

NO
8.108

DO NOT ATTEMPT
21.621

Does your firm match proxies to all record holders as of the
record date?
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Do INVESTMENT MANAGERS HAVE SUFICIENT RESOURCES TO VOTE
PROXIEs ACCORDING TO CLIENT GUIDELINE?

Eighty-eight percent of investment managers reported that their
firm has sufficient staff and resources to vote proxies according to
proxy voting guidelines of individual pension fund clients.2" Six
percent of investment managers do not have sufficient resources to
provide individualized proxy voting, and 6% said they would do it
only under certain conditions and for certain types of funds. When
we asked if investment managers have sufficient resources to provide
individualized proxy voting, one investment manager replied, "[O]f
course not; we use only our own guidelines." 97 This investment
manager's attitude was shared by other managers.298

296. Investment Manager Survey Q 9.
297. Survey #351.
298. See Survey #364 ('We voted based on our proxy policy."); #385 ('We vote according to our own guidelines.).
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CHART 16

YES
88.571

NO
5.714

ONLY CERTAIN FUND6
5.714

Does your firm have sufficient staff and resources to vote
proxies according to proxy voting guidelines of individual
pension fund clients?
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Do PRoxy VOTERS USE PROXY SERVICES?

Sixty percent of public funds subscribe to proxy research services
and 8% of union funds subscribe to such services. 2" Eight percent
of investment managers subscribe to proxy research services, 54% research proxy issues in-house, and 38% do both.'
ON WHAT TYPES OF ISSUES SHOULD INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS HAVE A RIGHT TO VOTE?

We listed seven issues and asked whether respondents believe
that pension fund investors should have a right to vote on these issues. Directors were less enthusiastic than trustees and investment
managers about allowing shareholders to vote on these issues.
Poison pills: 48% of directors, 97% of investment managers,
91% of public funds, and 92% of union funds think institutional
investors should have a right to vote on poison pills.3"'
Golden parachutes: 26% of directors think that institutional investors should have a right to vote on golden parachutes, as did 92%
of investment managers, 96% of public funds, and 77% of union
funds.
Greenmail: 50% of corporate directors believe that institutional
investors should be allowed to vote on greenmail, as do 92% of
30 3
investment managers, 89% of public funds, and 77% of unions.
Recapitalization Plans: 57% of corporate directors believe that

299. Pension Survey Q 28.
300. Investment Manager Survey Q 5. No funds do neither.
301. Pension Survey Q 27; Investment Manager Survey Q 47; Director Survey Q 19. According to a 1990 survey by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), 67% of
pension funds said that shareholders should have the right to vote on poison pills. Support
for Shareholder Rights Grows Among Institutional Investors, Poll Says, 17 Pens. Rep. (BNA)
No. 48, at 1993 (Nov. 26, 1990).
302. A 1990 survey by Institutional Investor reported that 54% of plan officials believe
that institutional investors should vote against golden parachutes. Speaking Out, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, July 1990, at 203. According to a 1992 survey by the National Association of
Corporate Directors, 50% of corporate CEOs believe that shareholders should have the right
to vote on golden parachutes. Survey Reveals CEO Attitudes on Reform, 9 CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL. (IRRC) No. 2, at 12 (Mar.-Apr. 1992).
303. According to a 1990 survey by Institutional Investor, 92% of plan officials believe
that institutional investors should have the right to vote on poison pills, greenmail, mergers
and acquisitions, and recapitalization plans. Speaking Out, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July
1990. at 203.
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institutional investors should be able to vote on recapitalization plans;
95% of investment
managers, 89% of public funds, and 77% of union
4
funds agree.3

Mergers and Acquisitions: 38% of corporate directors think that
shareholders should have the right to vote on mergers and acquisitions; as do 82% of investment managers; 91% of public funds, and
85% of union funds. °
ESOPs Created as a Defensive Tactic: 40% of corporate directors think that institutional investors should have a right to vote on
defensive ESOPs; 97% of investment managers voted in favor, as did
87% of public funds, and 85% of union funds.3°
Executive Compensation: Only 10% of corporate directors think
that institutional investors should have a right to vote on executive
compensation; 62% of investment managers, 78% of public funds,
and 69% of union funds think investors should have a voice with respect to executive compensation.
HoW MUCH SUPPORT EXISTS FOR CORPORATE CONSTITUENCY
STATUTES AND CONFIDENTIAL VOTING?

We also asked whether the respondents support corporate constituency statutes and confidential voting.
Corporate constituency statutes: 27% of public funds and 92% of
union funds support constituency statutes.3 7 Forty percent of directors do not favor corporate constituency statutes, 42% favor these
statutes, and 17% are not sure. 8 More than 27% of corporate directors do not know if their corporation is subject to a constituency
statute. 31 One director favors corporate constituency statutes but
comments that, "It's an extremely slippery slope." 1 0 Another direc-

304. Id.
305. Id.
306. A 1990 survey by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) reported that
85% of pension funds believe that shareholders should have the right to vote on the creation
of ESOPs. Corporate Governance: Proxies Becoming Do-It-Yourself Task, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Jan. 22, 1990, at 70.
307. Pension Survey Q 26; Director Survey Q 17. We did not ask investment managers
this question. One public fund refused to endorse corporate constituency statutes "ifthey put
stakeholders ahead of shareholders." Survey #500.
308. Director Survey Q 17.
309. Director Survey Q 18.
310. Survey #100476; see also #100397 ('Voluntary compliance [is] preferable.").
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tor supports the idea, but does not believe it should be legislated.3 11
One director noted that "it is the primary area of concern for the long
term health of a company." 3" Another director said that "it could
be overdone and become an excuse for poor results. ' 313 Another
agreed: "The board room should
not be a place where special inter31 4
ests come to cross swords.

Confidential Voting: 60% of directors support confidential voting,
while 76% of public funds and 54% of union funds favor confidential
voting. 315 Of the companies surveyed, 44% have confidential vot3 16

ing.

In response to the question, "Do you believe shareholder votes
should be confidential?," 31 7 one director said confidential voting is
"not really an issue. 313 Another director said it is "not necessary
and burdensome., 319 One director stated that he opposes confidential
voting and said that "the best way for a shareholder to avoid pressure
after voting is to say 'call me again and I will vote against management until management is changed."'3 20 One director is against con3 21
fidential voting but favors independent tabulation.
Yet, investment managers generally agree that if confidential
voting were required, conflicts of interest and improper solicitation
would not occur so frequently.32 Dale Hanson, CEO of CalPERS,
favors confidential voting: "Currently corporate managers are free to
tabulate votes as they are cast, to identify shareholders who are not

311. Survey #100036 (I "support [the] thrust but not in statutes.").
312. Survey #100212. See also Survey #100314 ("The corporation must consider those
interests.").
313. Survey #100232.
314. Survey #100133.
315. Pension Survey Q 24; Director Survey Q 21. We did not ask investment managers
this question. A 1992 survey by the National Association of Corporate Directors found that
42% of corporate CEOs supported mandated confidential voting. Survey Reveals CEO Attitudes on Reform, 9 CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL. (IRRC) No. 2, at 12 (Mar.-Apr. 1992). A
1990 survey by Institutional Investor found that 77% of plan officials favor confidential voting. Speaking Out, INSTrTLONAL INVESTOR, July 1990, at 203.
316. Director Survey Q 20.
317. Director Survey Q 21.
318. Survey #100113.
319. Survey #100225. But see Survey #100399 ("Absolutely essential. Otherwise, conflicts
of interest are too inhibiting.).
320. Survey #100314.
321. Survey #100060. Another director said that he does not "feel strongly one way or
the other." Survey #100445a.
322. See supra, notes 270-79 and accompanying text.
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following management's voting recommendations and to pressure
shareholders to change their vote."3" Independent tabulation and
confidential voting would deter improper management solicitation.
SHOULD DIRECTORS BE REQUIRED TO OWN CORPORATE STOCK?

We asked whether corporate directors should be required to own
corporate stock.324 Ninety-three percent of corporate directors said
that directors should be required to own corporate stock; of those,
29% said that stock should be awarded as part of compensation and
64% said directors should be required to buy shares."z The minimum suggested stock ownership ranged from 100326 to 1000327
32
shares. 8

One director suggested that directors should hold between 5%
and 100% of the director's annual fee in stock. 329 Several suggested
monetary amounts of $10,000330 and one suggested $25,000.31
Other directors suggested no minimum332 and one director cautioned
that the amount should not be too large: "Don't choose directors
based on personal wealth. 333
Several directors commented on the issue of stock ownership by
directors, saying that it would have no effect: "[It's] not an issue".334 "Stock ownership for independent directors is of practically
no consequence to his position on issues." 335 336
"Again, a director is
either going to fulfill his responsibility or not.
Several directors said that stock ownership should be encouraged
but not required: "Ownership should be encouraged and awarded as

323.
Hanson,
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

Corporate Proxy Voting System, supra note 256, at 12 (statement of Dale M.
CEO of CalPERS).
Director Survey Q 25.
Director Survey Q 25.
Surveys #100060, 100311, 100386, and 100477.
Surveys #100116, 100334, 100452, 100225, and 100137.
Director Survey Q 26.
Survey #100270.
Surveys #100382, 100115, and 100314.
Survey #100490.
Surveys #100322 and 100158.
Survey #100200.
Survey #100113.
Survey #100171.
Survey #100232.
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compensation but I'm against [a] mandatory requirement." ' "They
338
should have [a] sizeable portion but [it should] not be required.t
"There should be no requirement but a strong practical and moral
339
obligation."
The reactions of investment managers and pension funds varied.
Forty-six percent of the investment managers agreed that directors
should be required to own corporate stock, as compared with 68% of
public pension funds and 62% of union funds.' Twenty-three percent of investment managers, 31% of public pension funds, and 31%
of union funds said the stock should be awarded as part of compensation, while 23% of investment managers, 36% of public funds and
31% of union funds would require directors to buy the shares."
Public pension funds suggested minimums that run the gamut from
2 one year of retainer fees, 343
1% of the director's net worth,
$5,000,'" to the lesser of 1000 shares or $20,000. 34' Public funds,
like directors, also urged caution: "Mandatory minimum share ownership keeps well qualified people off boards; i.e., academics or religious leaders."' Another fund trustee suggested two tiers: inside
directors would be required to own a "very large amount" of stock
while outside directors must own a "moderate amount."' 347 Another
trustee suggested that whatever the amount, it should "have a meaningful impact on [director's] lifestyles." 348 A director countered:
"[It's] not material. This ownership will never
be significant enough
349
to influence decision-making by a director."
According to the 1989 Egon Zehnder survey previously described, 81% of corporate directors believe that directors should be
required to hold stock in companies on whose boards they serve. 5
337. Survey #100212.
338. Survey #100265.
339. Survey #100036. 'Shares as a part of director compensation are fine but should not
be required. Director ownership on any other basis should be a personal - not a corporate
decision." Survey 100445a.
340. Pension Survey Q 36; Investment Manager Survey Q 25.
341. Pension Survey Q 36.
342. Survey #562.
343. Survey #503.
344. Survey #530.
345. Survey #584.
346. Survey #502.
347. Survey #511.
348. Survey #588.
349. Survey #100133.
350. Egon Zehnder Int'l, Behind Closed Doors: Unrest in the Ranks, CORP. ISSUES MONI-
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Directors overwhelmingly (87%) disagree that they should be compensated only with stock.35' Sixty-nine percent of directors agree that
"directors are likely to have the same commitment to representing
352
shareholders' interests regardless of their equity holdings.
In 1992, Coopers & Lybrand surveyed attitudes toward minimum
stock ownership.353 Most CEOs agree that executives should be required to retain significant amounts of company stock. Twenty-one
percent of CEOs strongly agree that executives should be required to
own significant amounts of company stock, and 31% simply
agree. 54 Board members agree even more enthusiastically: 28%
strongly agree and 33% agree. 355 The majority of CEOs 356 and
board members 357 agree that directors should receive a major por-

tion of their fees in stock.
SHOULD INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS MONITOR
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION?

We asked pension funds whether they (or their representatives)
monitor executive compensation. 35 Fifty-five percent of all investment managers monitor executive compensation. 359 Forty-one percent of public funds and 8% of union funds monitor executive compensation.

36
0

TOR, at 1 (Jan. 1989). 81% of corporate directors agreed, 17% disagreed, and 2% were not

sure.
351. Id. 87% of directors disagreed, 9% agreed and 4% were not sure.
352. Id. at 5.
353. Coopers & Lybrand, The Coopers & Lybrand Survey on Executive Compensation
Issues in the 90's (1992).
354. Id. On a scale of 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree), CEOs responded: "1"
(21%), "2" (16%), "3" (15%), "4" (17%), "5" (8%), "6" (9%), and "7" (14%).
355. Id. Board members responded: "1" (28%), "2" (17%), "3" (16%), "4" (11%), "5"
(7%), "6" (7%), and "7" (14%).
356. Id. CEOs responded- "1" (20%), "2" (19%), "3" (15%), -4" (18%), "5" (7%), "6"
(9%), and "7" (12%).
357. Id. Board members responded. "1" (20%), "2" (16%), "3" (15%), "4" (15%), "5"
(9%), "6" (8%), and "7" (17%).
358. Pension Survey Q 33.
359. Investment Manager Survey Q 22.
360. Pension Survey Q 33.
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CHART 17
PERCENTAGES

Yes

No

Not Sure

RESPONDENTS
1
M

PUBLIC FUNDS

MUNION FUNDS

INVESTMENT MANAGERS

Does your fund (or representative) monitor executive compensation?
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SHOULD ExEcuTivE COMPENSATION BE TIED
36
TO CORPORATE PERFORMANCE? '

Our survey found that 51% of investment managers, 31% of
union funds, and 34% of public funds said that corporate performance
affects how they vote on director nominees.362 Eighty-one percent of
directors said that executive compensation should be tied to corporate
performance, 5% disagreed, and 13% said it depends on the corporation.363 Ninety-five percent of the corporations surveyed tie compensation to performance.3es One director said that compensation is tied
to performance at his corporation "but not tightly enough." 365 One
fund representative who monitors executive compensation expressed
astonishment: "The fact [that] anyone would need to ask this question
is frightening." 3 Another fund replied that they were the only institutional investor in 1992 to file a shareholder proposal on a compensation committee.367
Directors made several suggestions on how to tie compensation
to performance. Suggestions include: "Compensation should have
three components: Base - according to ability and contribution;
Short-term -according to short-term (1-3 years); results; Long-term
- according to 3+ year increases in financial value (not just stock
price)". 3 Another director suggested that compensation "should be
balanced and take into account all relevant factors including basic
profitability, comparison with competition, growth, etc." 369 One director cautioned: "[You] need to be careful - in turnarounds for
example, performance may take several years. [You] need to reward
the turn-around manager during tough years for taking on the
task., 370 Another director observed that the "big problem is how to
separate these trends in markets served vs. net performance. Peer

361. Director Survey Q 27; Pension Survey Q 34; Investment Management Survey Q 23.
362. Pension Survey Q 35; Investment Manager Survey Q 24.
363. Director Survey Q 27.
364. Director Survey Q 28.
365. Survey #100133.
366. Survey #511; see also Survey #509 (stating that "[Performance measurement]
benchmarks must be meaningful.").
367. Survey #502.
368. Survey #100314.
369. Survey #100171. Another director suggested that "at least annual bonuses and longterm plans should be tied to performance." Survey #100225.
370. Survey #100502.
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analysis, so far, works best."371
We asked investment managers and pension funds the same
question.37 In response, 77% of investment managers said compensation should be tied to performance, 5% prefer no linkage, and 18%
said that it depends. Eighty percent of public pension funds and 77%
of union funds would tie compensation to performance, 2% of public
funds and 15% of union funds would not link compensation with performance, and 18% of public funds and 8% of union funds said that
it depends on the corporation.3" An investment manager observed
that "in some cases, executive compensation has little correlation with
corporate performance." 374 Another said, "for most industries, yes,
' 75
[compensation should be tied to performance, for] others, no."
Another investment manager clarified that
compensation "should be
376
tied to long-term corporate performance."

371. Survey #100133.
372. Investment Manager Survey Q 23.
373. Pension Survey Q 34.
374. Survey #212.
375. Survey #339.
376. Survey #298; see also Survey #341 (explaining that "[tjhere should be elements of
performance-related criteria in compensation.").
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CHART 18
PERCENTAGES

80 F-

60 -

No

Yes

Depends on Corp

RESPONDENTS
=
H

PUBLIC FUNDS

UNION FUNDS

INVESTMENT MANAGERS

CORPORATE DIRECTORS

Should executive compensation be tied to corporate performance?
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According to the 1992 Coopers & Lybrand survey previously
described, 30% of CEOs strongly agree that full disclosure of total
executive compensation packages is necessary." 7 Fifty-nine percent
of board members were of like mind.378 Only 12% of CEOs
strongly agree that shareholders should have more influence on executive compensation practices, while 21% disagree, and 26% strongly
disagree. 379 Thirty-one percent of board members think shareholders
should have a stronger influence on executive compensation practices.38 0 Fifty-five percent of CEOs3 8 and sixty-eight percent of
board members 31 strongly agree that executive pay should be more
directly linked to company performance. Not surprisingly, CEOs overwhelmingly objected to caps on executive compensation: 69% of
CEOs oppose caps.38 3 Board members split on the issue of
caps:
34
24% strongly favored caps, while 34% strongly opposed caps. 8
SHOULD INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS MEET WITH DIRECTORS
TO

Discuss CORPORATE PERFORMANCE?

Should pension fund investors monitor corporate performance?
Ninety-five percent of investment managers said yes; 73% of publics
funds agreed, and 38% of union funds replied in the affirmative.
95% of corporate directors believe that institutional investors should
monitor corporate performance.

377. Coopers & Lybrand, The Coopers & Lybrand Survey on Executive Compensation
Issues in the 90's (1992). On a scale of 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree), CEOs
responded as follows: "1" (30%), "2" (20%), "3" (11%), "4" (10%), "5" (7%), "6" (10%),
and "7" (12%).
378. Id. Board members responded: "1" (59%), "2" (13%), "3" (7%), "4" (5%), "5" (4%),
"6" (5%), and "7" (7%).
379. Id. CEOs responded: "1" (12%), "2" (10%), "3" (9%), "4" (10%), "5" (12%), "6"
(21%), and "7" (26%).
380. Id. Board members responded: "1" (31%), "2" (11%), "3" (14%), "4" (10%), "5"
(9%), "6" (11%), and "7" (14%).

381. Id. CEOs responded: "1" (55%), 2" (23%), "3" (13%), "4" (6%), "5" (1%), "6"
(1%), and "7" (1%).
382. Id. Board members responded: "1"(68%), "2" (18%), "3" (6%), "4" (3%), "5" (2%),
"6" (1%), and "7" (2%).
383. Id. CEOs responded: "1" (13%), "2" (7%), "3" (6%), "4" (5%), "5" (9%), "6"
(16%), and "7" (44%).
384. Id. Board members responded: "1"(24%), "2" (10%), "3" (5%), "4" (8%), "5" (6%),
"6" (13%), and "7" (34%). A 1991 survey by Georgeson & Co. found that 61% of fund
managers oppose caps on executive compensation. News: Reports, 19 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 18
(Jan. 6, 1992).
385. Director Survey Q 3; Pension Survey Q 30; Investment Manager Survey Q 19.
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Seventy-nine percent of corporate directors believe that institutional investors should meet with management to discuss corporate
performance. 386 58% of investment managers, 44% of public funds
and 15% of union funds agree. 7

CHART 19
PERCENTAGES

Yes

No

Not Sure

RESPONDENTS

B

PUBLIC FUNDS

UNION FUNDS

INVESTMENT MANAGERS

CORPORATE DIRECTORS

Do you believe that institutional investors should meet with
management to discuss corporate performance?

386. Director Survey Q 4.
387. Pension Survey Q 31; Investment Manager Survey Q 20. A 1990 survey by Institutional Investor found that almost 63% of plan officials -believe it is appropriate for a pension fund to meet with corporate management to talk about the company's performance."
Speaking Out, INSTITrMONAL INVESTOR, July 1990, at 203.
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Many investment managers reported that they meet with management to discuss corporate performance. 8 Fifty-five percent meet
with management frequently, 13% meet occasionally, 26% meet rarely, and 26% have not met in the last twelve months.8 9
Twelve percent of public pension funds frequently meet with
management to discuss corporate performance, 9% meet with management occasionally, 16% rarely meet, and 63% have not met with
management in the last twelve months."9 Of the union funds, 15%
occasionally meet with corporate management to discuss corporate
performance and 85% have never met.
SHOULD THE PROXY RULES BE CHANGED?

Since CalPERS submitted its proposal for proxy reform to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, there has been an outpouring of
complaints about the proxy system.3 9' Nell Minow describes the
problems with the proxy process:
A director once told me that shareholders who submit shareholder
resolutions were 'playing baseball on a football field.' The problem
is that sometimes you are standing on a football field and all they
give you is a bat and a baseball ....
[P]laying baseball on a football field ... is an awkward and inefficient way to get the football
through the goalposts. Clearly, the proxy rules, written for a time
when the shareholder community and the technology were very
different, need to be overhauled ....

Shareholders do not want to be quarterbacks. But when they buy

388. Investment Manager Survey Q 21.
389. Id.
390. Pension Survey Q 32.
391. See Jayne Zanglein, Pensions, Proxies and Power: Recent Developments in the Use
of Proxy Voting to Influence Corporate Governance, 7 LAB. LAW. 771, 794-803 (1991) for a
detailed analysis of the CalPERS proposal. In November 1989, CaIPERS requested the SEC
to undertake a comprehensive review of the proxy rules. CaIPERS made 48 proposals for
reform. Letter from Dale M. Hanson to Linda C. Quinn (Nov. 3, 1989), reprinted in PLI,
PROXY CONTESTS, INST. INVESTOR INITIATIVES, MANAGEMENT RESPONSES 1990 (1990), at
640. (Complete copy on file with the author). On June 24, 1992, the SEC published its
second proposed rules on shareholder communications. These rules are reprinted in 19 Pens.
Rep. (BNA) 1124 (June 29, 1992). Among other things, the SEC has proposed that shareholders be allowed to "make a public announcement of how it intends to vote and provide
the reasons for that decision without having to comply with the proxy rules.- Id. at 1128.
These rules were adopted by the SEC on October 16, 1992.
392. Minow, supra note 72, at 40-41.
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stock, they find themselves on a football field, and they don't want
to have [to] swing a baseball bat just to get in the game. 3
Minow is not alone in her criticism. Gray Davis, the Comptroller
of California, says, "The proxy system is totally biased toward management, and you need a Ph.D. to understand it."'39 Raymond J.
Sweeney, general counsel for the Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund recalls, "About two years ago, we decided we'd vote all
the proxies and I was assigned to do it. I thought, 'I can read and
after billing my clients for six hours
write, I can understand this,' and 395
and getting nowhere, I gave up.
Roderick M. Hills, a lawyer who has served as an officer and
director of "a dozen large corporations," 3" describes the problems
inherent in the current proxy system:
The principal problem with the proxy contest is that the "playing
field is not level." Management controls the process: they set the
schedule and they can change the schedule. Management gets the
voting lists quicker and management controls the shareholder meeting when it does occur .... Even where management is entirely
fair, the dissidents will find that the process is clumsy. Voting lists
are inaccurate, mailings
are complex and some proxy solicitors are
3 7
just ineffiCient.
Economist John Pound explains:
The net effect of these [SEC regulations] . . .is an absurd situation,
in which investing institutions are forced to function on an individual basis rather than through collective action. They cannot coordinate
with the dozens of other institutions in the shareholder pool; they do
not form coalitions. Rather, each institution acts as an island unto
itself, monitoring its portfolio companies in a manner uncoordinated
with those of any of its peers.398

393. Id. at 41.
394. Alison Leigh Cowan, Trying to Decode Proxies? Read Very, Very Carefully, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 13, 1992, at D1, D4.
395. Id.
396. Corporate Proxy Voting System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and
Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1989) (statement of Roderick M. Hills, Managing Partner, Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irvine).
397. Id. at 9; see also Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 520, 592-94 (1990) (providing an excellent description of the problems inherent in the
proxy process); see also Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992).
398. William Taylor, Can Big Owners Make a Big Difference?, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-
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Not all participants in the proxy process believe it is slanted toward
management. John Wilcox, managing director of Georgeson and Company, a proxy solicitation firm, believes that "[w]hile the Proxy Process is technically complicated, cumbersome and inefficient in some
respects, its impact is neutral and it does not give advantages to
either incumbents or dissidents ....
The Business Roundtable claims that the proxy rules did not
need reform.' The Business Roundtable criticized the initial SEC
proxy proposals, saying they
would plunge the proxy process into secret back-room dealings
among powerful institutional investors with billions of dollars of
assets, rely on expensive after-the-fact, private litigation ...

and

would place the fate of the corporations in the hands of many of
the same financial intermediaries who were the driving force behind
the excessive takeovers of the 198s °1
Bruce Atwater, Chairman of the Business Roundtable's Corporate
Governance Task Force also strongly criticized the SEC's proposed
shareholder communication rules:
It is, if I may so characterize it, a radical proposal. I strongly believe it would undercut the SEC's historic premise that investors are
best protected by the full disclosure of all actions that would change
the nature or degree of an investor's interests or his ability to protect them. It would allow powerful institutional investors to solicit

Oct. 1990, at 70, 75.
399. Corporate Proxy Voting System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and
Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1989)
(testimony of John C. Wilcox, managing director of Georgeson & Co.). However, Wilcox
admits that "it is absolutely horrendous [for both sides on a proxy fight] to try and get
proxy material cleared by the Commission ....
The role of the Commission in clearing
proxy material has actually influenced the outcomes to certain proxy fights because they have
taken so long to clear material and quibbled so long over small points of grammar and word
usage. It's almost random." Id. at 57.
400. Patrick McGurn, Business, Shareholders Battle over Proxy Rule Changes, 8 CORP.
GOVERNANCE BUL. (IRRC) No. 5, at 1, 4 (Sept.-Oct. 1991). Bruce Atwater, [chairman of
the Business Roundtable's corporate governance task force] says, "The SEC appears to have
come up with a cure [for a nonexistent disease] . . . Humpty Dumpty is not broken, but the
'proxy reformists* want to push him off the shelf without worrying about who is to put it all
back together again . . . ."Id.
401. Joel Cheroff, Business Takes Shots at Proxy Proposals, PENSIONS & INVESTMENT
AGE, Sept. 30, 1991, at 4.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol10/iss1/2

90

Zanglein: Who's Minding Your Business? Preliminary Observations on Data and
19921

Who's Minding Your Business?

proxy voters in secret, without the other stockholders or the company management being aware of the action ....
It would give rumors, half-truths, and misinformation a new force
that neither management nor the other shareholders would be able to
respond to or correct. 402

One director who opposed the SEC proposed proxy rules said, "I
don't think shareholders can understand in depth the company, the
industry in which it operates, the competitive pressure and the scope
of opportunities enough to play an adequate role in power-sharing ....
I envy those who run privately owned companies."4 3
Our survey was conducted while the SEC was considering proposed changes to the proxy rules. On October 16, 1992, two-and-ahalf months after we finished collecting data for our survey, the SEC
amended its proxy rules. One of the major changes the SEC made
was to exempt from proxy statement delivery and disclosure requirements certain communications between shareholders, including an
announcement by a shareholder on how it intends to vote.4
We asked whether the respondents supported certain changes to
proxy rules.' ° Some results were surprising. Thirty-two percent of
directors would require independent tabulation, 34% of directors
would prohibit bundling of proposals, and 23% of directors would
ease SEC restrictions on shareholder communications. Other responses
were less surprising. Not one director was in favor of cumulative
voting or a requirement that management include representative shareholders comments on director nominees in the proxy statement.
Several directors commented that no changes are necessary:
"[The rules] are proven and time tested."
"No changes needed to

402. Shareholder Rights, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., at 188 (1991) (prepared
statement of Bruce Atwater, Chair of the Business Roundtable's Corporate Governance Task
Force).
403. Kevin G. Salwen & Joann S. Lublin, Giant Investors Flex Their Muscles More at
U.S. Corporations, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1992, at Al, A6.
404. SEC, Final Rules on Shareholder Communications and Disclosure of Executive Compensation, reprinted in 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, Special Supplement (Oct. 16,
1992).
405. Director Survey Q 40. Several directors criticized the question itself: "This is fantasy
as [the] SEC lacks authority to accomplish most of these measures without legislation.- Survey #100399. "The question suggests a basic misunderstanding of the role of the SEC." Survey #100476. Nevertheless, most respondents answered the question.
406. Survey #100257.
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obtain what shareholders want." °7 "Real investors know good management and business. They don't need more regulations and
rules."4 8' One director took a different position: "The issue is not
the proxy rules! The issue is to make corporate management understand that it works for the owners of the company and encourage
communication between those holders, management, and the
board."4 ° Another comment: "Ease restrictions on communications
- let the CEO tell what he is trying to do without worrying about
410
lawyers and the 'strike' firms that make a living out of 'gotcha.'
Another director suggested that the "support required for [a] proposal
to be resubmitted for inclusion in [a] proxy statement should [be increased] from 1st year support of 3%, 2nd year support of 6% and
following years of support of 10% to 5%, 8% and 12% respective4 11

ly.9

Investment managers favor more changes to the proxy rules than
directors. Fifty percent would mandate confidential voting, 50% would
require independent tabulation of votes, 49% would ease restrictions
on shareholder communications, 38% would require proxy materials
to be distributed sooner so that investors have more time for review,
49% would allow shareholders to nominate directors, and 66% would
prohibit the bundling of proxy proposals.41
Public funds had the greatest support for changes to the proxy
rules. Sixty-six percent of public funds would mandate confidential
voting, 70% would require independent tabulation, 74% would ease
restrictions on shareholder communications, 65% would give shareholders access to shareholder lists, 52% would allow large shareholders to submit more than one proposal, 64% would require proxy
materials to be delivered sooner, 66% would allow shareholders to
nominate directors, 68% would require management to include representative shareholder comments on director nominees in the proxy
statement, 61% would require management to include representative
shareholder comments on management in the proxy statement, 66%
would regulate the counting of shareholder votes, and 77% would
prohibit bundling of shareholder proposals. Public funds suggested

407. Survey #100334.
408. Survey #100386.
409. Survey #100502.
410. Survey #100397.
411. Survey #100036.
412. Final rules adopted by the SEC on October 16, 1992, ease shareholder communication and prohibit the bundling of proxy proposals.
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additional changes from "simplify" 3 to "encourage corporate democracy, in all its ramifications."4 14
Predictably, union funds were not as supportive of proxy reform.
However, 75% of union funds would require proxy materials to be
delivered sooner, 67% would require management to include representative shareholder comments on management proposals in the proxy
statement, 67% would prohibit bundling, 58% would allow shareholders to nominate directors, 58% would require management to include
representative shareholder comments on director nominees in the
proxy statement, and 50% would require independent tabulation of
votes.
The responses are noted in the following charts:

CHART 20A
MANDATE CONFIDENTIAL VOTING

PUBLIC FUNDS

UNION FUNDS

INVESTMENT MANAGERS

CORPORATE DIRECTORS
0%

20%

40%

CHANGE

60%

IFZZ

80%

100%

NO CHANGE

NOTSURE

413. Survey #584; see also Survey #517 ("Avoid legal language"); Survey #540 (mandate
a prescribed format for the proxy statement).
414. Survey #567.
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CHART 20D
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CHART 20F
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CHART 20J
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CHART 20L
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SHOULD EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE BE CHANGED?
Many suggestions for reform of executive compensation disclosure have been made. For example, the Business Roundtable supports
independent compensation committees and encourages its members to
appoint only non-management members of the board of directors to
executive compensation committees.4 1 The Business Roundtable also suggests that "[t]he overall structure of executive compensation and
share ownership programs should directly link the interests of the
executives, either individually or as a team, to the long-term interests
of the shareholders."416 The Business Roundtable also suggests that
annual compensation packages should not be compared with annual
stock price movements "as such a practice would tend to foster shortterm behavior
and is not a useful barometer of current financial per41 7
formance.

Anthony O'Reilly, CEO of H.i. Heinz, criticizes accounting
practices that include stock options in annual compensation: "It is
absurd to say the pay of somebody is the same as what they earned
in the year they exercised options .... It is financial illiteracy of the
highest kind."" In response to our survey, one director suggested:
[The] reporting of option values needs attention. [The] present system leads to headlines that are inaccurate, misleading, and inflammatory. Options must be valued at [the] time of issue and reported
only at that time as per stock award. 1
An outside director suggested that "compensation disclosure should
420
and will be broken down into relevant components.,
Several investment managers also offered suggestions for proxy
reform. One manager advocated "easier to read and fuller disclosure
of executive compensation - SOPs, etc. in less technical 'legalese'
language".42 ' Another suggested that the SEC "standardize a more
comprehensive requirement for disclosing executive compensa-

415.
416.

The Business Roundtable, Executive CompensationlShare Ownership I (Mar. 1992).
Id.

417. Id. at 4.
418. John A. Byrne, What, Me Overpaid? CEOs Fight Back, Bus. WK., May 4, 1992, at
142, 146.
419. Survey #100133.
420. Survey #100445a.
421. Survey #339; see also Survey #259 ("clearer English, less legalese").
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tion."422 Several public pension funds suggested "improved disclosure on executive compensation,"4 and "more extensive disclosure
of executive compensation and stock options." 424 Sarah A.B. Teslik,
executive director of the Council of Institutional Investor says, "We're
seeing more complicated packages and more finely tuned efforts to
obfuscate the actual amount of pay."425 She claims that compensation packages are designed to avoid the attention of shareholders.426
The SEC has addressed some of these issues in its final rules on
executive compensation disclosure, which were adopted after our
survey was completed.427 Among other things, the final rules require
detailed compensation charts and disclosure of all current compensation (cash and non-cash), awarded or earned by certain executives in
each of the three prior fiscal years and the corporate performance
factors on which the board relied in setting the compensation.42
The SEC rejected an earlier proposal which would have required detailed disclosure of stock option grants, including the amount of gain
that would be realized if the options were realized at certain leveis.429 The new rules allow corporations to choose between two option valuation methodologies, a practice which will generate widely
different valuations.4 Critics claim this new valuation rule will encourage a "'race to the bottom' as companies perform the calculations
required to ascertain the values under the various alternatives, then
use the method producing the lowest value. 431 One critic claims:
"(t]he compensation consultants can figure it (the option value) 29
ways from Sunday ... and some of those ways produce considerably
lower numbers than others."4' 32

422.

Survey #382.

423.

Survey #500.

424.
425.
147.
426.
427.
428.

Survey #509.
John A. Byrne, What, Me Overpaid? CEOs Fight Back, Bus. WK., May 4, 1992, at

429.

See Patrick S. McGurn & Ann Yerger, SEC Requires Detailed Compensation Re-

Id.
See 19 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 1090 (June 29, 1992).
Id. at 1094.

ports, 9 CORP. GOVERNANCE BULL. (IRRO) No.5, at 5 (Sept.-Oct. 1992).
430. SEC Final Rules on Shareholder Communications and Disclosure of Executive Compensation, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, Special Supplement, at S-36.
431. Ann Yerger, New Pay Disclosure Rules Include Loopholes, 9 CORP. GOVERNANCE
BULL. (IRRC) No. 6, at 14, 15 (Nov.-Dec. 1992).
432. Id.
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FUTuRE TRENDS

We asked each group of respondents whether they believe that in
the next decade pension funds will become more active with respect
to corporate governance. 433 Sixty-nine percent of directors predict
that institutional investors would become more active. One director
succinctly said, "I hope not." 34 Seventy-nine percent of investment
managers predict increasing activism, as do 85% of the public and
union funds. 35 These responses indicate that pension funds plan to
take a more active role with respect to corporate governance.

CHART 21
PERCENTAGES
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Do you believe that in the next decade institutional investors will
become more active with respect to corporate governance?

433. Director Survey Q 41; Pension Survey Q 51; Investment Manager Survey Q 48.
434. Survey #100386.
435. Director Survey Q 41; Pension Survey Q 51; Investment Manager Survey Q 48. Surveys, supra note 420; See also, Speaking Out, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, July 1990, at 203
(containing a 1990 survey by Institutional Investor which reported that 93% of pension officials believe that "large shareholders will play an increasing role in corporate governance in
the 1990s").
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Twenty-one percent of directors reported that during the last five
years their actions as directors have been affected by institutional
investors.4 36 Two directors made specific comments. One said, "Absolutely not!"437 The other director said that as a result of institutional directors, a by-law amendment was passed regarding independent directors.4 38
Other director comments to this question varied. Two directors
emphasized that institutional investors are no different than other
' 39
shareholders: "Hard to say! All shareholders are the same. 4 "Actions as [a] director are always governed by efforts to serve [the] best
interests of shareholders." 440 Two directors had completely opposite
reactions. One director reported that "calls from large investors have
director said, "So far [I've
been. very influential," 1 while another
2
been influenced] only negatively.""
We invited respondents to comment on the role institutional
investors should play with respect to corporate governance." 3 Responses varied tremendously.
Union funds internally hold diametrically opposed views. For
example, one union fund wrote that pension funds should have "plenwhile another union fund
ty!" to do with corporate governance,,'
said that pension funds should have "very little" role in corporate
governance." 5 Another union trustee commented that the role of
pension funds with respect to corporate governance is "to protect
shareholder interest."" 6 Another noted that "most trustees of ERISA
funds [are] not qualified" to be involved in corporate governance. 447
Investment managers also offered suggestions. One investment
manager recommended that "[p]ension funds should start acting more

436. Director Survey Q 39.
437. Survey #100386.
438. Survey #100036.
439. Survey #100382.
440. Survey #100227.
441. Survey #100490.
442. Survey #100225.
443. Director Survey Q 38; Pension Survey Q 53; Investment Manager Survey Q 50.
444. Survey #436; see also Survey #405 ("Reformation of the process and active ownership").
445. Survey #490; see also Survey #439 ("Any role in governance should be concerned
only with mid to long term corporate economic performance").
446. Survey #479.
447. Survey #419.
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like owners."' 8 "As the shareholders, pension funds should have an
active role in corporate decision-making."" 9 One manager commented that institutional investors should have a "more active role in
selecting directors - [the] process is too controlled by management. " 5' Another investment manager suggested that pension funds
take a "supervisory" role. 5s
Other investment managers favor a more neutral position for
institutional shareholders: "Be involved with decisions, but not to
influence." 2 Another advocates the exit model: "They should have
the right to vote their shares. They also have the right to sell." 3
Another investment manager interpreted ERISA as requiring institutional investors to have a "purely economic" role: "ERISA requires
that our sole duty is to act for [the] exclusive benefit of our plan
participants."'
Directors also had divergent views. Many said that institutional
investors should play no role in corporate governance.455 "They are
traders who don't have a clue regarding running a business.'"456 Another director said that institutional investors should play no role in
corporate governance "outside of voting 'in the usual way. '
Most directors said that institutional investors are the same as any
other shareholder. 4 8 "They are no better and no worse than any
other shareholder; they should have no special role., 459 Other directors advocated more access to the board of directors and financial

448. Survey #326; see also Survey #211.
449. Survey #289; see also Survey #259 ("Should be activr to protect their investment.")
450. Survey #263; see also Survey #248 ("Keep the playing field even, promote full
disclosure, vote their conscience.") and Survey #222 ("I believe that some of the . . . securities acts removed the capability for owners to act as owners and as a result we have created
a deified management culture in this country, [that] needs to change.").
451. Survey #325.
452. Survey #384; see also Survey #304: "Pension funds should have a 'minimal' role to protect investment."
453. Survey #257; see also #295 ('Generally, they should communicate their displeasure
and if they continue rebuttal [ ] they should sell the stock").
454. Survey #316. This is an example of more rhetoric to justify short-term investments;
see also Survey #284: "Vote shares in the best interest of shareholders."
455. Surveys #100349, 100060, 100212, 100386, and 100477.
456. Survey #100386.
457. Survey #100445a; see also Survey #100054 ("Very little [role]. Investors' primary
concern sould be financial performance."); Survey #100382 ("Vote and lobby board").
458. Surveys #100227, 100257, 100476, 100311, 100113, 100171, 100232, 100158,
100115, 100265, and 100315.
459. Survey #100476. They should have "1 vote per share." Survey #100467.
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information: "[Institutional investors] need to have direct access to
[the] board on [a] periodic basis." 46 "Each company should be
viewed on its own performance. As investors - particularly if longterm - they should ask for and expect to receive periodic reports on
performance. Currently they are inclined to establish a program for all
governance questions and [then] apply them indiscriminately." 1
Others stressed more caution before acting: "[Institutional investors
should] watch carefully, ask questions, [and] act only if necessary."

462

Another director said that institutional investors should:
(1)
(2)
(3)

show interest
ask questions - listen to answers
vote for or against director slates." 3

Others encouraged institutional investors to "make their views known
on issues in which they have an interest' 64 and "articulate their
concern and insight."465 But one director urged institutional investors not to forget that "they are agents for others .... [they can act]
any [way] they want as long as they do not conflict with the interests
of those whose money they invest." '
The 1989 survey by Egon Zehnder International asked directors
if "[t]he power of institutional investors in corporate governance is
growing out of proportion and [whether] something should be done to
control it." 1 Fifty percent of directors agreed that the power of institutional investors is growing out of control.468 We did not ask
this question, but clearly some directors are hostile to institutional
investors.

460. Survey #100502; see also Survey #100036 ("Open-door communications with management and periodic formal review of issues with management as a group."); Survey
#100137 ("Meeting with management on [a] regular basis and review[ing] operational resuits.-)
461. Survey #100225.
462. Survey #100399.
463. Survey #100314; see also Survey #100133 ("Toss out or support board as a whole
or individual director as [the] case may be.")
464. Survey #100270.
465. Survey #100397.
466. Survey #100334.
467. Egon Zehnder Intl, Behind Closed Doors: Unrest in the Ranks, CoRP. IssuEs MoNITOR, at 2 (Jan. 1989).
468. Id.
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CONCLUSION

John Nash, president of the National Association of Corporate
Directors, says, "The time is waning now when the CEO can say,
'It's my company. It's my board ....
It's going to be the
9
shareholders' company."'4 Shareholder activism is on the rise, but
investment managers, public funds, and union funds are diverse
groups with divergent interests. In some areas, particularly with respect to interpretation of the Avon Letter, proxy voters need more
guidance. They also need to be better educated on the Department of
Labor's position on proxy voting. Investment managers need resources
to better meet the needs of individual pension fund trustees. While
this may not be a practical proposition for large managers, there is a
niche to be filled by small and enterprising managers. The development of corporate governance index funds like the Lens Fund, headed
by Robert A.G. Monks and Nell Minow, and the LongView Fund,
sponsored by the Amalgamated Bank of New York, will provide a
vehicle for increased trustee involvement in governance issues.
Perhaps most disturbing is the apparent misinterpretation of
ERISA by some investment managers. Although ERISA requires
trustees to act solely and exclusively in the interest of participants
and beneficiaries, this does not mean that trustees must maximize
short-term investment returns.470 The Department of Labor has stated that, with respect to tender offers, "plans are not required to take
the 'quick buck' if they feel, based upon an appropriateand objective
analysis, that they will achieve a higher economic value by holding
the investment rather than tendering and reinvesting the proceeds."4 7' This allows trustees to favor long-term growth over short-

469. Kevin G. Salwen & Joann S. Lublin, Giant Investors Flex Their Muscles More at
U.S. Corporations,WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1992, at Al.
470. David George Ball, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Pension and Welfare Benefits,
has stated that fiduciaries must maximize investment returns. PWBA Plans to Speak Out on
OIG Charges, Ball Says, 16 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 2131, 2132 (Dec. 18, 1989). However, courts
have held that ERISA's prudence rules does not create an exclusive duty of maximizing
pecuniary benefits, Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 865 F.2d 364, 373 (D.C. Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1108 (1989); see also Anderson v. Mortell, 722 F. Supp. 462,
470 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (a fiduciary has no duty to "achieve the highest possible price on the
sale of securities"); Ershick v. United Missouri Bank, 12 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA)
2323, 2327 (D. Kan. 1990), af'd, 948 F.2d (10th Cir. 1991) (ERISA does not create a duty
to maximize pecuniary benefits).
471. David Walker, Corporate Governance Issues and Their Fiduciary Implications, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS DIGEST, Sept. 1989, at 3, 5 [italics in original]; see also Joint Department
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term gain if the decision is in the economic best interest of plan
participants and beneficiaries. 4 2 Pension funds can, and should be,
long-term investors who protect their interests through communication
with management and active monitoring of corporate agents.

of Labor/Department of Treasury Statement of Pension Investments (Jan. 31, 1989), reprinted
in, 16 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 215 (Sept. 21, 1987).
472. See, e.g., AFL-CIO Model Guidelines for Delegated Proxy Voting Responsibility, reprinted in, AFL-CIO, INVESTING IN OuR FuTURE: AN AFL-CIO GUIDE TO PENSION INVESTMENT AND PROXY Vo'nNG AFL-CIO 8 (1991) for an example of investment guidelines which
require fiduciaries to vote in the economic best interest of plan participants and beneficiaries,
but does not require them to maximize short-term gains if inconsistent "with the long-term
economic best interests of the participants and beneficiaries." Id. at 10. For a detailed description of these guidelines, see Jayne Zanglein, Pensions, Proxies and Power: Recent Developments in the Use of Proxy Voting to Influence Corporate Governance, 7 LAB. LAW. 771,
787-791 (1991).
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APPENDiX A
SURVEY OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS ON INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
This survey is funded by grants from the Fund for Labor Relations Studies and
Texas Tech University School of Law. The purpose of the survey is to obtain
detailed information from directors of Fortune 250 corporations regarding their
attitudes on the involvement of institutional investors in the proxy process. In
particular, I am seeking information as to how often your corporation
communicates with institutional investors, and what role, if any, institutional
investors have with respect to corporate governance. Your responses to this
survey will remain anonymous, unless you choose to waive anonymity. The
results of the survey will be published in a scholarly legal article. If you wish to
receive a copy of the article when it is published, please attach your business
card to the completed survey. (You will remain anonymous even if you attach
your business card unless you waive anonymity, in writing, at the end of the
survey).
Thank you for participating in this survey. Please return the survey as soon
as possible. A self-addressed envelope is provided for your convenience.
Send to:
Professor Jayne Zanglein
Texas Tech University
School of Law
Lubbock, Texas 79409-0004
If you have any questions, please call me at 806-742-3997. My FAX number is
806-742-1629.

Control Number
_
(Anonymity is guaranteed. The control number
will be used solely to monitor response rates.)
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SURVEY OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS ON INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
1.

How many years have you served as director of this corporation?

2.

Specify any other affiliation or relationship to the corporation
(i.e. officer, employee etc.)

3.

Do you believe that institutional investors should monitor corporate
performance? _Yes _No
Not sure

4.

Do you believe that institutional investors should meet with management
to discuss corporate performance? _Yes _No _Not sure

5.

Does your corporation have a shareholder advisory committee?
_Yes _No

6.

If yes, describe the composition of the committee. (Indicate numbers)
Number of institutional investors
Number of private investors
Number of inside directors
Number of outside directors
Other (specify)

7.

If your corporation has a shareholder advisory committee, how often does
it meet?
-Quarterly
_Once every six months
__Annually
Other (specify)

8.

If your corporation does not have a shareholder advisory committee, is
it likely that the board of directors will appoint arr advisory committee within
the next year?
It is unlikely that a shareholder advisory committee will be
established.
_It is likely that a shareholder advisory committee will be
established.
-It is possible that a shareholder advisory committee will be
established.
I don't know.

9.

If your corporation does not have a shareholder advisory committee, how
often within the last twelve months has management met with
institutional investors to discuss corporate performance?

-.Frequently

Occasionally
Rarely
Never
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10. Do you believe that institutional investors should have the right to sponsor
shareholder proposals in an effort to influence corporate governance?
__Yes _No _Not sure
11. Within the last five years, have institutional investors sponsored
shareholder proposals at your corporation? _Yes _No _Not sure
12. If yes, how often?
-Frequently
___Occasionally
-Rarely
Never
13. Is your corporation willing to meet with institutional investors who
have sponsored shareholder proposals to negotiate a settlement?
___Yes
No
___Depends on the proposal and the proponent
14. Does management solicit the votes of institutional investors?
-Frequently
Occasionally
-Rarely
Never
If so, on what types of issues?
15. Does management resolicit institutional investors to request them to
change a proxy vote?
-Frequently
Occasionally
-Rarely
Never
If so, on what types of issues?
16. Listed below are a number of common proxy issues. Which of these
issues do you believe usually have an impact on the economic value
of stock?
Has
No
Not
Impact
Impact Sure
a.
b.
c.

Contested election of directors
Uncontested election of directors
Provisions limiting director liability
and providing indemnification
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Has
Impact
d.

No
Impact

Not
Sure

Approval of executive stock option
plans

Recapitalization (increase in
authorized common stock,
blank check preferred stock, or
increase in corporate debt)
f. Reincorporation
g. Redemption of or vote on poison pills
h. Board size
i. Independent directors
j.
Supermajority voting requirements
k. Dual class voting
I. Confidential voting
m. Independent tabulation of proxies
n. Classified boards
o. Cumulative voting
p. Shareholders' right to call special
e.

meetings

q.
r.
s.
t.
u.
v.

Golden parachutes
Shareholder adviso-y committees
Minimum director stock ownership
Provisions which opt out of Delaware
takeover laws
Preemptive rights
Disclosure of executive

-

_

compensation

w.

-

Restrictions on executive
compensation

x.
y.
z.
aa.
bb.

Director compensation
Targeted share placement
Independent compensation committee
Independent nominating committee
Provisions which limit terms of
directors

17. Are you in favor of corporate constituency statutes which allow
directors to consider the interests of groups such as employees,
consumers, suppliers, and the community?
__Yes _No
Not sure
Comment
18. Is your corporation subject to a shareholder constituency statute?
__Yes _No
Not sure
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19. On which of the following issues do you believe that institutional
investors should have a right to vote?
Poison pills
Golden parachutes
Greenmail
Recapitalization plans
Mergers and acquisitions
Executive compensation
ESOPs created as defensive tactic
20. Does your corporation have confidential shareholder voting?
__Yes _No
21.

Do you believe shareholder votes should be confidential?
___Yes _No
Comment

22. How many director positions are there on your board?
23. How many are held by outside directors?
24. Does the board have a policy with respect to the ratio of inside
directors to outside directors?
___Yes (Specify)
No
25. Do you believe corporate directors should be required to own corporate
stock?
___Yes, shares should be awarded to directors as part of compensation
___Yes, directors should be required to buy shares
No
Not sure
Comment
26. If you believe that corporate directors should be required to own corporate
stock, what should be the minimum amount of stock ownership? __
27. Should executive compensation be tied to corporate performance?
__Yes __ No
Depends on corporation

Comment
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28. Is executive compensation at your corporation tied to corporate
No
performance? _Yes
Comment
29. When nominating directors, does the board or nominating committee
consider whether the prospective nominee has ties to institutional
investors?
Yes
No
Not sure
Sometimes (Explain)
30. Do you believe the interests of institutional investors differ from the
interests of the board of directors?
___Yes, they differ significantly
___Yes, they differ slightly
No,they do not differ
Comment
31. Were any of your corporation's directors appointed at the request
of institutional investors?
Yes (If so, how many institutional representatives?
)
No
.

32. If your corporation has directors with ties to institutional investors,
has your corporation performed better or worse as a result oT the
involvement of institutional directors?
_Better
_Worse
Same
Not sure
Comment
33. If your corporation does not have directors with ties to institutional
investors, do you believe that your corporation would perform better or
worse if a representative of institutional investors served on the board
of directors?
Better
Worse
Same
Not sure
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Comment

34. Do you regard index fund investors differently than investors who
actively select your corporation for investment? _Yes
No
Comment
35. Do you believe that institutional investors should be long term invesiors?
_Yes _No _Not sure
36. Do you believe that institutional investors are long term investors?
__Yes _No _Not sure
37. How can corporations encourage long-term investment by institutional
investors?

38. What role, if any, do you believe institutional investors should have
with respect to corporate governance?

39. During the last five years, have your actions as a director been
affected by institutional investors?
Yes _No
Comment
40. Which of the following changes to the proxy rules do you think the SEC
should make?
No
Not
Change
Change
Sure
a. mandate confidential voting

-

b. require independent tabulation
of proxies
c. ease restrictions on shareholder
communications
d. require shareholder access to
shareholder lists
e. require cumulative voting

-
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Change
f.
g.
h.

i.
j.

k.

I.
m.

allow large shareholders to submit
more than one proposal
lift the 500 word limit on
shareholder proposals
require proxy materials to be
distributed sooner so that
investors have more time for
review
allow shareholders to nominate
directors
require management to include
representative shareholder
comments on director nominees
in the proxy statement
require management to include
representative shareholder
comments on management
proposals in the proxy statement
regulate the counting of
shareholder votes (i.e. whether
abstentions should count)
prohibit management proposals
that bundle unrelated proxy
issues

[Vol. 10:1

No
Change

Not
Sure

-

-

Describe any other ways the SEC should change its proxy rules.

41.

Do you believe that in the next decade institutional investors will
become more active with respect to corporate governance?
_-_Yes _No
Not sure

42. Your answers will remain anonymous unless you waive anonymity by
providing the following optional information:
Name of Corporation:
Your Name:

Your phone number:
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APPENDIX B
SURVEY OF INVESTMENT MANAGERS ON PROXY VOTING
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
This survey is funded by grants from the Fund for Labor Relations Studies and
Texas Tech University School of Law. The purpose of the survey is to obtain
information from investment managers as to how they vote proxies on behalf of
pension fund clients. In particular, I am seeking information as to whether
pension fund clients direct your firm to vote proxies in a particular manner, and
the extent of your firm's ability to respond to increasing involvement by pension
funds in the proxy process. Your responses to this survey will remain
anonymous, unless you choose to waive anonymity. The results of the" survey
will be published in a scholarly legal article. If you wish to receive a copy of the
article when it is published, please attach your business card to the completed
survey. (You will remain anonymous even if you attach your business card
unless you waive anonymity, in writing, at the end of the survey).
Thank you for participating in this survey. Please return the survey as soon
as possible. A self-addressed envelope is provided for your convenience.
Send to:
Professor Jayne Zanglein
Texas Tech University
School of Law
Lubbock, Texas 79409-0004
If you have any questions, please call me at 806-742-3997. My FAX number is
806-742-1629.
NOTE: IF YOUR FIRM DOES NOT HAVE ANY PENSION FUND CLIENTS,
AND RETURN SURVEY. PLEASE ANSWER SURVEY IF
CHECK HERE
YOUR FIRM HAS ANY PENSION FUND CLIENTS, EVEN IF YOU DO NOT
VOTE PROXIES FOR THOSE CLIENTS.

_
(Anonymity is guaranteed. The control number
Control Number
will be used solely to monitor response rates.)
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SURVEY OF INVESTMENT MANAGERS ON PROXY VOTING
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
1.

Approximate total market value of equity portfolios managed for pension
fund clients as of December 31, 1991: $

2.

Specify approximate size of equity portfolios managed for each type of
pension fund and percentage of shares for which you have proxy voting
authority:
corporate
government
union
foundations
other (specify)

$
$_
$.
$.
$.

%
%
%
%
%

3.

Does your firm have standard proxy voting guidelines? _Yes _No

4.

Does your firm match proxies to all record holders as of the record
date?
_Yes _No, we cannot match _No, we do not attempt to match

5.

Does your firm subscribe to a proxy research service or do you
research proxy issues in-house?
___We research proxy issues in-house
__We subscribe to proxy research service(s)
Both
_Neither

6.

How many pension fund clients does your firm have?

7.

How many pension fund clients have delegated proxy voting
authority to your firm?

8.

Does your firm vote proxies on behalf of pension fund clients?
_-_Yes _No
If no, explain
(IF NO, PROCEED TO QUESTION 19)

9.

Does your firm have sufficient staff and resources to vote proxies
according to proxy voting guidelines of individual pension fund clients?
_Yes _No
Only for certain funds (Describe conditions)

10. Of the pension fund clients which have delegated proxy voting authority
to your firm:
a. how many have their own proxy voting guidelines?
b. how many have granted discretionary authority to your firm to vote
proxies ?
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11. Have you ever been asked by a pension fund client which has delegated
proxy voting authority to your firm, to vote a proxy contrary to the proxy
voting guidelines? __Yes _No
Not sure
12. If yes, how often has this occurred?
.Frequently _Occasionally _Rarely

Never

Describe types of proxy issues on which trustees have directed your firm
to vote contrary to the proxy voting guidelines

13. How does your firm report to pension fund clients on proxy voting?
(check all applicable)
__Through written reports
___Through oral reports at fund meetings
_Through discussions outside of fund meetings
_We do not provide proxy voting reports
14. How often does your firm report to pension fund clients on proxy voting?
__Monthly
Quarterly
Every six months
-Annually
__On request
15. Within the last two years, have any of your pension fund clients voiced
disagreement with a proxy voting decision made by your firm?
__Yes _No _Not sure
16. If yes, how often within the last two years?
_Once or twice
_Between 3 - 5 times
Between 5 - 10 times
_More than 10 times
Describe the types of issues on which disagreement occurred and what
action, if any, your firm took as a result.

17. Have any of your pension fund clients ever asked your firm to return
proxies to the trustees to vote? _Yes _No _Not sure
If so, explain
18. Has your firm ever lost a pension fund client because your firm refused to
vote proxies as directed by the client? _Yes _No
Not sure
If so, explain
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19. Do you believe pension fund investors should monitor corporate
performance? ___Yes
No __Not sure
20. Do you believe pension investors should meet with management to
discuss corporate performance? __Yes _No _Not sure
21. How often does your firm meet with management on behalf of pension fund
clients to discuss corporate performance?
__Frequently __.Occasionally _Rarely __Never
22. Does your firm monitor executive compensation?
__Yes
No
Not sure
23. Do you believe that executive compensation should be tied to corporate
performance? _Yes _No _Depends on corporation
Comment
24. Does corporate performance affect how your firm votes on director
nominees? __Yes _No
Not sure
25. Do you believe corporate directors should be required to own corporate
stock?
___Yes, shares should be awarded to directors as part of compensation
__Yes, directors should be required to buy shares
No
Not sure
26. Do representatives of your firm serve on any shareholder advisory
committees? _Yes _No
Not sure
If so, how many committees?
27. Do representatives of your firm serve on any boards of directors?
_Yes _No _Not sure
If so, how many boards?
28. Usted below are a number of common proxy issues. Which of these Issues
do you believe usually have an impact on the economic value of stock?
Has
Impact
a.
b.
c.
d.

No
Impact

Not
Sure

Contested election of directors
Uncontested election of directors
Provisions limiting director liability
and providing indemnification
Approval of executive stock option
plans
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Has
Impact

No
Impact

Not
Sure

e.

Recapitalization (increase in
authorized common stock,
blank check preferred stock, or
increase in corporate debt)
f. Reincorporation
g. Redemption of or vote on poison pills
h. Board size
i.
Independent directors
j. Supermajority voting requirements
k. Dual class voting
I. Confidential voting
m. Independent tabulation of proxies
n. Classified boards
o. Cumulative voting
p. Shareholders' right to call special
meetings
q. Golden parachutes
r. Shareholder advisory committees
s. Minimum director stock ownership
t. Provisions which opt out of Delaware
takeover laws
u. Preemptive rights
v. Disclosure of executive
compensation
w. Restrictions on executive
compensation
x. Director compensation
y. Targeted share placement
z. Independent compensation committee
aa. Independent nominating committee
bb. Provisions which limit terms of
directors
29. What is the average portfolio turnover rate of all of your clients?

%

30. What is the average portfolio turnover rate of your pension fund
clients?
%
31. How many of your pension fund clients invest in index funds?

__

32. What percentage of equity portfolios managed by your firm on behalf of
pension fund clients was indexed as of December 31, 1991?

%

33. Do you believe that investing in an index fund affects an investors
ability to influence corporate governance? ___Yes _No
Not sure
Comment
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34. Do you believe the interests of pension fund investors differ from the
interests of the board of directors?
___Yes, they differ significantly
__Yes, they differ slightly
__No, they do not differ
Comment

35. Do you believe that corporations would perform better or worse if a
representative of pension fund investors served on the board of directors?
___Better ___Worse __Same _Not sure
Comment
36. Do you believe that pension fund investors should be long term investors?
__Yes _No
Not sure.
37. Do you believe that pension fund investors are long term investors?
_Yes _No
Not sure
Comment
38. If one of your pension fund clients were offered a takeover premium with
respect to a tender offer, how would you advise your client?
_I would advise my client to take the premium only if it was substantial
I would advise my client to take the premium only if it was adequate
_I would advise my client not to take the premium
I would advise my client not to take the premium unless it was in
the long-term econoriic best interests of the pension plan participants
_Other
(IF YOUR FIRM DOES NOT VOTE PROXIES ON BEHALF OF PENSION FUND
CLIENTS, PROCEED TO QUESTION 46)
39. Has your firm ever simultaneously represented a corporation and a
pension fund client which intended to vote its proxies against that
corporation's management?
Frequently __Occasionally _Rarely _Never
40. If so, do you feel this placed your firm in a conflict of interest?
_Yes _No
Not sure
Comment
41. Do you have any suggestions for ways to avoid this type of conflict of
interest?
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42. Does corporate management solicit your firm with respect to proxies
which are voted on behalf of pension fund clients?
Frequently __Occasionally ___.Rarely __Never
If so, on what types of issues?
43. Has your firm ever been resolicited to change a proxy vote that already had
been cast on behalf of a pension fund client?
Never
__Frequently _Occasionally _Rarely
If so, on what types of issues?
44. Do you believe that any management solicitation has been improper?
__Yes _No
Comment
45. Does your firm ever abstain on proxy issues on behalf of pension fund
clients? (You may check more than one answer)
__.Frequently
Occasionally
-Rarely
__Yes, with respect to controversial or social issues
__Yes, with respect to de minimis issues
_Never
___Other (explain)_
46. Which of the following changes to the proxy rules do you think the SEC
should make?
No
Not
Sure
Change
Change
a. mandate confidential voting
b. require independent tabulation
of proxies
c. ease restrictions on shareholder
communications
d. require shareholder access to
shareholder lists
e. require cumulative voting
f. allow large shareholders to submit
more than one proposal
g. lift the 500 word limit on
shareholder proposals
h. require proxy materials to be
distributed sooner so that
investors have more time for
review
i. allow shareholders to nominate
directors
-

-

-
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Change

No
Change

Not
Sure

j. require management to include
representative shareholder
comments on director nominees
in the proxy statement
k. require management to include
representative shareholder
comments on management
proposals in the proxy statement
I. regulate the counting of
shareholder votes (i.e. whether
abstentions should count)
m. prohibit management proposals
that bundle unrelated proxy
issues
Describe any other ways the SEC should change its proxy rules __

47. On which of the following issues do you believe that pension fund
investors should have a right to vote? (Check all applicable)
Poison pills
Golden parachutes
Greenmail
Recapitalization plans
Mergers and acquisitions
Executive compensation
ESOPs created as defensive tactic
48. Do you believe that in the next decade pension funds will become more
active with respect to corporate governance? _Yes _No
Not sure
49. Do you believe that pension funds should have the right to sponsor
shareholder proposals in an effort to influence corporate governance?
_Yes _No
Not sure
50. What role, if any, do you believe pension fund investors should have with
respect to corporate governance?

51. Your answers will remain anonymous unless you waive anonymity by
providing the following optional information:
Name of Firm:
Your Name:
Your Title:
Your Phone Number:

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol10/iss1/2

124

Zanglein: Who's Minding Your Business? Preliminary Observations on Data and
19921

Who's Minding Your Business?

APPENDIX C

PROXY VOTING SURVEY FOR
PENSION TRUSTEES
This survey is funded by grants from the Fund for Labor Relations Studies and Texas
Tech University School of Law. The purpose of the survey is to obtain information from
trustees of public and union pension funds as to proxy voting. In particular, I am
seeking information as to your fund's proxy voting policies, and interest, if any, in
monitoring corporate performance or influencing corporate governance. Your
responses to this survey will remain anonymous, unless you choose to waive
anonymity. The results of the survey will be published in a scholarly legal article. If
you wish to receive a copy of the article when it is published, please attach your
business card to the completed survey. (You will remain anonymous even if you
attach your business card unless you waive anonymity, in writing, at the end of the
survey).
Thank you for participating in this survey. Please return the survey as soon
as possible. A self-addressed envelope is provided for your convenience.
Send to:
Professor Jayne Zanglein
Texas Tech University
School of Law
Lubbock, Texas 79409-0004
If you have any questions, please call me at 806-742-3997. My FAX number is
806-742-1629.
NOTE: IF YOUR FUND DOES NOT INVEST IN STOCKS, PLEASE CHECK HERE
AND RETURN SURVEY. PLEASE ANSWER THE SURVEY IF YOUR FUND
VOTES PROXIES OR IF YOUR FUND HAS DELEGATED PROXY VOTING
AUTHORITY.

(Anonymity is guaranteed, The control number will be
_
Control Number
used solely to monitor response rates.)
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PROXY VOTING SURVEY FOR
PENSION TRUSTEES
1.

Type of Fund:
_
Public
International Union
Local Union
Other (specify)

2.

Type of Plan:

3.

Estimated market value of assets as of December 31, 1991: $

4.

Estimated percentage of assets invested in stock as of December 31, 1991:

5.

Estimated annual turnover rate of stock portfolio:

6.

How often do the trustees usually meet?
__Monthly
__Quarterly
__Every other month
Annually
__Once every six months
Other (Explain)
_As needed

7.

How often do equity managers make presentations before the
board of trustees?
__The fund does not employ equity managers
__All equity managers report at every meeting
__One or more equity managers report at every meeting
-Equity managers only give written reports outside fund meetings
__Other (explain)

8.

Who has responsibility for voting proxies with respect to the fund's
stock portfolio? (Check all applicable answers and indicate the
approximate percentage of the fund's total stock holdings for which the
fiduciary votes proxies) Note: These people will be referred as the
"proxy voter" in subsequent questions.
Board of Trustees
(._
/%)
_Investment committee
(_
%)
External equity managers
or investment advisors
(._
/%)
In-house equity manager(s) (_
%)
_Custodian bank
(._
/%)
Master trustee
(._
/%)
__Other (specify)
(._
/%)

9.

Have the trustees adopted proxy voting guidelines?
_Yes _No _Not sure

Defined Benefit

Defined Contribution

%

10. If your fund employs external equity managers, do they have proxy voting
guidelines? _Yes _No
Not sure
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If the trustees have delegated proxy voting authority, have they ever
instructed the proxy voter to vote contrary to the proxy voting guidelines?
Not sure
___Yes _No

12. If so, how often has this occurred? _Frequently

-

Occasionally.-Rarely

Describe the types of issues on which the trustees have directed a proxy
voter to vote contrary to the proxy voting guidelines
13. How do proxy voters report to the trustees on proxy voting? (Check all.applicable)
___Through written reports
___Through oral reports at fund meetings
___Through discussions outside of fund meetings
__Our proxy voters do not provide proxy voting reports
Not sure
14. How often do proxy voters report to the trustees on proxy voting?
Annually
__Monthly
On request
___Quarterly
Not sure
Every six months
15. Within the last two years, have the trustees formally disagreed
with a vote made by a proxy voter? _Yes _No _Not sure
16.

If yes, how often within the last two years?
_Once or twice
Between 3 - 5 times
Between 5 - 10 times
More than 10 times
Describe the types of issues on which disagreement occurred and what
action, if any, the trustees took as a result

17. Have the fund's trustees ever asked a proxy voter to return proxies to
the trustees to vote? ___Yes _No _Not sure
If so, explain
18. Has a proxy voter ever refused to vote proxies according to the fund's proxy
Not sure
voting guidelines? _Yes _No
_

19. Have the fund's trustees ever fired a proxy voter who refused to vote
Not sure
proxies according to the trustees' directions? ___Yes _No
If so, explain
20. How often does corporate management solicit your fund's proxy votes?
Not sure
Never
Occasionally _Rarely
Frequently
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If so, on what types of issues?

21. How often has your fund been resolicited to change a proxy vote that already
was cast?
Frequently .Occasionally
_Rarely
Never
Not sure
If so, on what types of issues?

22.

Do you believe that any management solicitation has been improper?
_Yes _No
If so, explain

23. Do the trustees (or their fiduciaries) ever abstain on proxy issues? (Check all
applicable)
I don't know
Frequently
Occasionally
Rarely

Yes, with respect to controversial or social issues
__Yes, with respect to de minimis issues
Never
Other (Explain)
24. Are you in favor of confidential proxy voting? _Yes _No

Not sure

25. Are you in favor of a majority of independent directors?
Not sure
_Yes _No
26. Do you support corporate constituency statutes which allow directors to
consider the impact of a corporate decision on constituencies such as
employees, consumers and the community? _Yes _No
Not sure
27. On which of the following issues do you believe that pension fund
investors should have a right to vote?
Poison pills
Golden parachutes
Greenmail
Recapitalization plans
Mergers and acquisitions
Executive compensation
ESOPs created as defensive tactic
28. Does your fund subscribe to any proxy research services?
__Yes _No
Don't know
If so, specify
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29. Listed below are a number of common proxy issues.
issues do you believe usually have an impact on the
stock held by the plan?
Has
Impact

Which of these
economic value of
No
Impact

Not
Sure

a.
b.
c.

Contested election of directors
Uncontested election of directors
Provisions limiting director liability
and providing indemnification
d. Approval of executive stock option
plans
e. Recapitalization (increase in
authorized common stock,
blank check preferred stock, or
increase in corporate debt)
f. Reincorporation
g. Redemption of or vote on poison pills
h. Board size
i. Independent directors
j.
Supermajority voting requirements
k. Dual class voting
I. Confidential voting
m. Independent tabulation of proxies
n. Classified boards
o. Cumulative voting
p. Shareholders' right to call special
meetings

q.
r.

Golden parachutes
Shareholder advisory committees

s.

Minimum director stock ownership

t.

Provisions which opt out of Delaware
takeover laws
Preemptive rights
Disclosure of executive

u.
v.

_

compensation

w.

Restrictions on executive
compensation

x.

Director compensation

y.
z.
aa.
bb.

Targeted share placement
Independent compensation committee
Independent nominating committee
Provisions which limit terms of
directors

30. Do you believe pension fund trustees, in their capacity as investors,
Not sure
should monitor corporate performance? ___Yes _No
31. Do you believe pension fund trustees (or their representatives) should meet with
management to discuss corporate performance? ___Yes _No _Not sure
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32. How often within the last twelve months have the trustees (or their
representatives) met with management to discuss corporate
Rarely
Never
Occasionally
Frequently
performance?
33. Does your fund (or representatives) monitor executive compensation?
_Yes _No
Not sure
34. Do you believe that executive compensation should be tied to
Depends on corporation
corporate performance? _Yes _No
Comment
35. Does corporate performance affect how your fund's fiduciaries vote on
director nominees? _Yes _Not __Not sure
36. Do.you believe corporate directors should be required to own corporate
stock?
_Yes shares should be awarded to directors as part of compensation
_Yes, directors should be required to buy shares
No

Not sure
If so, what should be the minimum amount of stock ownership?
Comment
37. Do representatives of your fund serve on any shareholder advisory
committees? ___Yes _No

Not sure

If so, how many committees?.
38. Do representatives of your fund serve on any board of directors?
_Yes _No
Not sure
If so, how many boards?

39. Has your fund ever sponsored a shareholder proposal?
Not sure
_Yes _No
40. If so, how often?
More than ten shareholder proposals per proxy season
Between 5 - 10 proposals per proxy season
Between 3 - 5 proposals per proxy season
__One or two proposals per proxy season
Occasionally
41. Does your fund belong to any shareholder advisory groups?

__Yes

No (If yes, specify)
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42. Does your fund invest in index funds? _Yes _No

Not sure

43. If your fund invests in index funds, as of December 31, 1991,
approximately what percent of your fund's stock portfolio was indexed?

%

44. Do you believe that ERISA requires trustees to vote proxies?
Not sure
_Yes _No
45. If you index, do you believe that indexing affects your fund's ability
to influence corporate governance? ___Yes _No _Not sure
Comment
46. Do you believe the interests of institutional investors differ from the
interests of the board of directors?
__Yes, they differ significantly
___Yes, they differ slightly
__No, they do not differ
Comment
47. Do you believe that corporations would perform better or worse if a
representative of pension fund investors served on the board of directors?
_Better _Worse _Same _Not sure
48. Do you believe that pension funds should be long-term investors?
Not sure
__Yes _No
49. Do you believe that pension funds are long-term investors?
Not sure
_Yes _No
50. If your fund owned stock of a company which was the target of a takeover
attempt, would you tender your shares to the acquirer?
__Yes, only if we were offered a substantial premium
___Yes, only if we believed the premium was adequate
No
No, if it was in the long-term economic best interests of the plan
participants not to tender our shares
___Other (specify)
51. Do you believe that in the next decade pension funds will become more
Not sure
active with respect to corporate governance? _Yes _No
52. Do you believe that pension funds should have the right to sponsor shareholder proposals in an effort to influence corporate governance?
Not sure
_Yes _No
53. What role, if any, do you believe pension funds should have with respect
to corporate governance?
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54. Which of the following changes to the proxy rules do you think the SEC
should make?
No
Not
Change
Change
Sure
a. mandate confidential voting
b. require independent tabulation
of proxies
c. ease restrictions on shareholder
communications
d. require shareholder access to
shareholder lists
e. require cumulative votingf. allow large shareholders to submit
more than one proposal
g. lift the 500 word limit on
shareholder proposals
h.. require proxy materials to be
distributed sooner so that
investors have more time for
review
i. allow shareholders to nominate
directors
j. require management to include
representative shareholder
comments on director nominees
in the proxy statement
k. require management to include
representative shareholder
comments on management
proposals in the proxy statement
I. regulate the counting of
shareholder votes (i.e. whether
abstentions should count)
m. prohibit management proposals
that bundle unrelated proxy
issues

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Describe any other ways the SEC should change its proxy rules

55. Your answers will remain anonymous unless you waive anonymity by
providing the following optional information:
Name of Fund:
Your Name:
Your Title:
Your phone number:
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APPENDix D

TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY
Schol oftaw
Box 40004
Lubbock. TX 79409-0004
(806) 742-3791
FAX (806) 742-1629

May 19, 1992

^FI

^

Dear ^F2^:
I am conducting a survey of proxy voting policies of union
and public pension funds. The survey is funded through a grant
from the Fund for Labor Relations Studies and is designed to
collect empirical data for an article on pension investment
activity.
As part of the survey, I am collecting proxy voting
guidelines from pension funds. I would greatly appreciate a copy
of your fund's voting guidelines. If your fund has not adopted
proxy voting guidelines, please complete the enclosed
questionnaire. A self-addressed envelope is enclosed for your
convenience.
If you would like a copy of the survey results, please
enclose your business card and I will send you a copy of the
article when it is published.
Thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely,

Jayne Zanglein
Associate Professor of Law

An Affirmative Action Institution
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ANSWER ONLY IF YOU DO NOT HAVE ANY PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES
Name of Fund:
Indicate the reason your fund has not developed proxy voting
guidelines:
We do not invest in stock
We have delegated proxy voting authority to an investment
manager who follows its own guidelines
We do not believe that trustees are required to adopt
proxy voting guidelines
We believe that trustees are required to adopt proxy
voting guidelines but we have not yet adopted any
guidelines
Other (Explain)

Please return in the enclosed self-addressed envelope. If the
envelope is missing, return to Professor Jayne Zanglein, Texas
Tech University School of Law, Lubbock, Tx 79409.
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APPENDIX E

STEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY
School of Law

Box 40004
Lubbock, TX 79409-0004
(806) 742-3791
FAX (806) 742.1629

April 2, 1992

^FI

^

Dear ^F2^:
I am conducting a survey of proxy voting policies of
investment managers and advisers who vote proxies on behalf of
pension fund clients. The survey is funded by a grant from the
Fund for Labor Relations Studies and is designed to collect
empirical data for an article on pension investment activity.
As part of the survey, I am collecting proxy voting
guidelines from investment managers who represent pension fund
clients. I would greatly appreciate a copy of your firm's proxy
voting guidelines. If your firm does not have any pension fund "
clients, does not vote proxies, or does not have standard proxy
voting guidelines, please complete and return the enclosed
questionnaire. I have enclosed a self-addressed envelope for
your convenience.
If you would like a copy of the survey results, please
enclose your business card and I will send you a copy of my
article when it is published.
Thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely,

Jayne Zanglein
Associate Professor of Law

An Affirmative Action Institution
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PLEASE COMPLETE IF YOUR FIRM DOES NOT HAVE ANY PENSION FUND

CLIENTS, DOES NOT VOTE PROXIES, OR DOES NOT HAVE STANDARD PROXY
VOTING GUIDELINES:
Name of Firm:
(Check all applicable)
We do not have any pension fund clients.
We do not vote proxies on behalf of our clients.
We do not have any standard proxy voting guidelines.
Other (Explain)

Please return in the enclosed envelope. If the envelope is
missing, return to Professor Jayne Zanglein, Texas Tech
University School of Law, Lubbock, TX 79409.
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APPENDix

F

Fortune 250 (Publicly Held) Arranged in Order of
Institutional Holdings with Turnover Rates'

corporation
Chiquita Brands
Storage Technology
Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Imcera Group
Inland Steel
James River Corp.
MAPCO
VF
Deere
Gannett
Hercules
Whirlpool
Amp
Rohm & Haas
Sundstrand
Xerox
Armstrong World Ind.
Harnischfeger Ind.
Pitney Bowes
Williamette Ind.
Echlin
Fruit of the Loom
Harris
Parker Hannifin
Polaroid
Reynold Metals
Alcoa
BF Goodrich
Intel
Loral
Kellogg
Liz Claiborne
Litton Industries
Tandem Computers
Air Products & Chemical
Baker Hughes

Institutional
Holdings %
83
82
80
79
79
79
79
79
78
78
78
78
77
77
77
77
76
76
76
76
75
75
75
75
75
75
74
74
74
74
73
73
73
73
72
72

# of

Institutional
Holders
121
106
112
198
96
179
153
207
293
377
189
232
368
161
116
342
188
132
344
121
157
125
176
163
132
249
319
129
425
174
366
280
120
167
307
272

Turnover
Rate
97.1
211.0
172.5
94.2
69.7
68.3
65.4
53.3
96.3
44.4
81.0
74.8
45.4
26.5
55.6
76.6
81.8
73.4
45.1
82.2
67.3
102.4
71.1
51.7
87.7
93.3
86.2
88.7
281.6
99.9
30.7
109.8
67.3
106.1
53.5
100.3

1 The 1992 Business Week 1000, BUS. WK., 1992 Special Bonus
Issue; CDA Spectrum 3. This list does not include publicly held
corporations such as Royal Dutch Petroleum, Unilever U.S., LTV,
J.E. Seagram, Total Petroleum, Sequa, Manville, Crown Central
Petroleum, and Gencorp, as we were unable to obtain information
as to the percentage of institutional holdings and the turnover
rates.
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Corporation
Honeywell

Motorola
Phelps Dodge
Scott Paper
United Technologies
Witco
Raytheon
Sun Microsystems
Temple-Inland
Union Camp
Bethlehem Steel
Champion Int'l
Hasbro
Illinois Tool Works
Knight Ridder
USX
Coastal
Digital Equipment
Whitman
Becton Dickinson
Caterpillar
Diamond Shamrock
Eaton
Gillette
Kerr-McGee
Kimberly-Clark
Amax
Apple Computer
R. R. Donnelly & Sons
W. R. Grace
Morton International
Pfizer
Tyco Laboratories
Avon Products
Burlington Resources
Dresser Industries
Martin Marietta
McGraw-Hill
Texas Instruments
Warner Lambert
Allied Signal
Brunswick
Dana
Eli Lilly
Emerson Electric
Masco
Minn. Mining & Mfg.
American Cyanamid
Ball
Baxter International

Institutional
Holdings %

# of
Institutional
Holders

72
72
72
72
72
72
71
71
71
71
70
70
70
70
70
70
69
69
69
68
68
68
68
68
68
68
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
66
65
65
65
65
65
65
64
64
64
64
64
64
64
63
63

63
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292
411
229
262
357
111
369
185
229
310
125
222
180
224
202
158
237
347
171
257
297
84
195
411
200
406
171
337
296
236
225
575
161
209
330
287
237
241
213
473
290
146
132
552
487
247
582
403
127
462

Turnover
Rate
71.5
87.9
141.3
67.8
74.1
39.3
64.8
410.4
58.2
66.9
110.5
69.4
77.3
31.2
49.2
NA
78.5
128.9
61.2
95.8
74.2
63.9
52.4
67
57.1
49.7
77.5
393
34
85.1
62.2
64.2
76.7
140.7
61.6
84.2
69.6
48
118.4
98.3
70.7
83.4
39.7
56.9
31
56.4
41.3
83.2
62.6
55.4
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CPC International
Lockheed
Premark International
Schering-Plough
Sherwin-Williams
Texaco
Textron
American Home Products
Cyprus Minerals
EG & G
Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Mead
McDermott
Trinova
Cooper Industries
Dover
General Mills
Georgia Pacific
Ingersoll-Rand
Monsanto
Pennzoil
Boise Cascade
F4C
Philip Morris
Unocal
Avery Dennison
Johnson Controls
Universal
Arvin Industries
Black & Decker
Bristol-Myers-Squibb
Johnson & Johnson
Amerada Hess
Colgate Palmolive
E-Systems
International Multifoods
International Paper
Merck
Mobil
Murphy Oil
National Semiconductor
Tenneco
Atlantic Richfield
Armco
Eastman Kodak
Timken
Weyerhauser
Anheuser-Busch
Corning
Harsco

Institutional
Holdinas %

# of
Institutional
Holders

63
63
63
63
63
63
63
62
62
62
62
62
62
62
61
61
61
61
61
61
61
60
60
60
60
59
59
59
58
58
58
58
57
57
57
57
57
57
57
57
57
57
56
56
56
56
56
55
55
55

390
175
160
515
221
541
226
659
157
173
231
183
139
124
341
209
462
318
247
410
192
131
169
764
356
180
157
124
63
141
750
683
264
403
176
84
390
712
629
134
114
292
565
112
553
115
326
489
343
98
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Rate
53.4
112.3
88.7
79.6
51.3
60.7
46.5
41.2
87.5
46
141.2
58.2
113.1
75.3
41.2
36.6
35.5
92.1
64.1
77.1
46.5
85.3
45.8
50.9
67
45.8
48.8
72.9
59.5
150.9
51.7
54.8
68.1
61.9
77.4
63.6
92.7
43.7
40.2
38
129.1
101
49.4
54.8
69.1
40.5
61.2
35.5
64.5
52.1
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Corporation
TRW

Coca Cola
Quantum Chemical
Sun
American Brands
Engelhard
Pepsico
Upjohn
Westvaco
Amoco
Cummins Engine
General Electric
Hewlett-Packard
Archer-Daniels-Midland
Quaker Oats
Asarco
Dow Chemical
Ford Motor
H.J. Heinz Rockwell International
Union Carbide
Abbott Laboratories
Chrysler
Ashland Oil
Boeing
Borden
Clorox
IBM
Olin
Stanley Works
Amdahl
New York Times
Ralston Purina
Louisiana-Pacific
PPG Industries
Stone Container
Compaq Computer
Conner Peripherals
Navistar Int'l
Sara Lee
Seagate Technology
Procter & Gamble
Rubbermaid
Times Mirror
General Dynamics
Phillips Petroleum
Tribune
Westinghouse Electric
Chevron
Coca-Cola Enterprises

Institutional
Holdings t

# of
Institutional
Holders

55
54
54
54
53
53
53
53
53
52
52
52
52
51
51
50
50
50
50
50
50
49
49
48
48
48
48
48
48
48
47
47
47
46
46
46
45
45
45
45
45
45
45
45
44
44
43
43
42
41

225
610
75
196
421
131
630
371
211
604
77
738
500
400
313
125
496
372
410
243
179
618
158
170
541
367
222
729
100
178
123
171
279
158
320
163
220
98
131
458
80
549
311
209
141
324
182
329
549
83
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Turnover
Rate
39
31.5
529.3
29.8
43.1
47.1
61.2
129.3
32.1
28.2
81.6
39.3
72.5
51
61.9
68
52.9
61.3
46.6
29.2
95.3
35.4
79.6
50.2
87.9
55.1
53.8
73.5
58.6
36.2
67.9
37.4
47.3
97.3
42.4
144
334.1
277.7
53.9
39.2
520.7
41.1
31.9
25
104.8
48.4
40.1
93.8
30.7
32
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I of
Cornoration
Conagra
Paccar
Springs Industries
Crown Cork & Seal
E. I. Dupont De Nemours
McDonnell Douglas
Northrup
Exxon
Tosco
Ethyl
Maytag
Dow Jones
Lyondell Petrochemical
Dean Foods
General Motors
Teledyne
Campbell Soup
Grumman
Occidental Petroleum
Sonoco Products
Adolph Coors
Hershey Foods
Wang Laboratories
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer
Geo. A. Hormel
Unisys
York International
RJR Nabisco Holdings
Tyson Foods
Berkshire Hathaway
Fina
Mattel
West Point-Pepperell

Institutional
Holdings %

Institutional
Holders

41
41
41
40
40
40
40
39
39
38
38
37
36
35
35
34
32
32
31
29
27
26
24
21
19
19
16
15
12
9
3
N/A
N/A

294
122
99
165
555
131
119
711
81
213
168
158
76
112
476
126
278
102
273
116
104
228
95
133
74
131
48
229
83
32
19
185
6
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Rate
50.9
64.6
39.5
49.4
31.8
103.6
59.2
22
116
44.5
68.7
24.7
37.7
36
61.7
51.1
32.5
39.2
66.5
37.9
95.6
29.9
60.5
26.2
20.5
179.6
NA
67.3
54.4
5
2
117.2
3.7
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APPENDIX G
Proxy Voting Guidelines
Public Funds'

Management Proposals

For
(%)

Election of Directors
Selection of Auditors
Increase Authorized
Common Stock
Blank Check Preferred
Stock
Classified Board
Fair Price Provision
Limiting Shareholders'
Right to Call Special
Meetings
Limiting Shareholders'
Right to Act by
Written Consent
Supermajority Voting
Requirements
Considering
Nonfinancial Effects of
a Merger Proposal
Protection of
Director Indemnity and
Indemnification
Stock Option Plans
Reincorporation
Mergers
Restructurings
Spinoffs
More Than One Class
(or vary number)
of Directors
Changes in
Capitalization
Different Classes of
Voting Stock
Stakeholder Provisions

Against
(%)

Case
by
Case
(%)

No
Policy
(%)

57
68

0
0

29
14

14
18

14

11

54

39

4
14
18

32
61
25

25
21
32

39
4
25

4

18

25

53

4

36

25

35

4

64

21

11

4

0

18

78

25
11
11
18
14
4

11
7
11
0
0
0

43
43
50
43
29
21

21
39
28
39
57
75

0

4

21

75

4

7

14

75

0
0

43
7

7
0

50
93

1
Policies for some issues do not always total 100% because
the language in the guidelines was vague and fell under two or more
categories.
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Who's Minding Your Business?

Corporate Governance
Shareholder Proposals

For
(%)

Against
(%)

Case
by
Case
(%)

No
Policy

(%)

Poison Pills
Confidential voting
Antigreenmail Proposals
Opt Out of State
Antitakeover Law
Equal Access to the

0
50
50

43
4
4

25
14
11

32
32
35

21

0

14

65

Proxy
Golden/Tin Parachutes
Adopt Cumulative Voting
Curtailment or Fixing of
Executive Compensation
Report on Directors/
Employees Formerly in
Government Service
Mandatory Retirement or
Tenure for Directors
Minimum Share Ownership
for Directors
Majority of Board
Consisting of Outside
Directors
Incentive Compensation
and Salary Levels
Report on Salaries of
Directors & Employees
Social Policy Issues
Eliminate Preemptive
Rights
"Minor" Bylaw Changes
Purchase of Company's
Own Stock

21
50

4
32
21

14
25
18

65
43
11

0

0

0

100

0

4

0

96

4

7

0

89

4

7

0

89

11

0

4

85

11

4

36

49

4
7

0
4

0
68

96
21

36
0

4
0

0
4

60
96

0

0

11

89
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APPENDIX H
Proxy Voting Guidelines
Union Funds

Case
Management Proposals

For

Election of Directors
Selection of Auditors
Increase Authorized
Common Stock
Blank Check Preferred
Stock
Classified Board
Fair Price Provision
Limiting Shareholders'
Right to Call Special
Meetings
Limiting Shareholders'
Right to Act by
Written Consent
Supermajority Voting
Requirements
Considering
Nonfinancial Effects of
a Merger Proposal
Protection of
Director Indemnity and
Indemnification
Stock Option Plans
Reincorporation
Mergers
Restructurings
Spinoffs
More Than One Class
(or vary number)
of Directors
Changes in
Capitalization
Different Classes of
Voting Stock
Stakeholder Provisions

(M)

Against

(9)

by
Case

(M)

No
Policy

(M)

60
60

0
0

0
0

40
40

40

0

20

40

40
20
20

20
40
40

0
0
0

40
40
40

0

20

0

80

0

20

0

80

0

80

0

20

0

0

0

100

60
40
40
20
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0

20
0
40
40
20
0

20
60
20
40
80
100

20

0

0

80

20

0

20

60

0
0

60
0

0
0

40
100

0
60
40

40
0
0

20
0
0

40
40
60

40

0

0

60

Corporate Governance
Shareholder Proposals
Poison Pills
Confidential Voting
Antigreenmail Proposals
Opt Out of State
Antitakeover Law
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Who's Minding Your Business?

Against

For

)

(M
Equal Access to the
Proxy
Golden/Tin Parachutes
Adopt Cumulative Voting
Curtailment or Fixing of
Executive Compensation
Report on Directors/
Employees Formerly in
Government Service
Mandatory Retirement or
Tenure for Directors
Minimum Share Ownership
for Directors
Majority of Board
Consisting of Outside
Directors
Incentive Compensation
and Salary Levels
Report on Salaries of
Directors & Employees
Social Policy Issues
Eliminate Preemptive
Rights
"Minor" Bylaw Changes
Purchase of Company's
Own Stock

Case
by
Case

No
policy

()

(%)

0
0
20

0
40
40

0
20
20

100
40
20

0

0

0

100

0

0

0

100

0

0

20

80

0

0

20

80

0

0

0

100

20

0

0

80

0
0

0
40

0
60

100
0

40
0

0
0

0
0

60
100

20

0

0

80
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APPENDIX I
Proxy Voting Guidelines
Investment Managers'
Case
Management Proposals

For

(%)
Election of Directors
Selection of Auditors
Increase Authorized
Common Stock
Blank Check Preferred
Stock
Classified Board
Fair Price Provision
Limiting Shareholders'
Right to Call Special
Meetings
Limiting Shareholders'
Right to Act by
Written Consent
Supermajority Voting
Requirements
Considering
Nonfinancial Effects of
a Merger Proposal
Protection of
Director Indemnity and
Indemnification
Stock Option Plans
Reincorporation
Mergers
Restructurings
Spinoffs
More Than One Class
(or vary number)
of Directors
Changes in
Capitalization
Different Classes of
Voting Stock
Stakeholder Provisions

Against

(%)

by

No

Case

Policy

(%)

(%)

68
69

0
0

6
3

26
28

31

16

16

37

10
15
10

23
37
23

10
8
6

67
40
61

8

18

5

69

8

11

5

76

6

40

8

46

6

2

5

87

34
27
16
10
10
3

5
10
15
0
0
0

6
10
16
26
6
5

55
53
53
64
84
92

5

5

5

85

0

5

5

90

0
0

31
5

2
0

67
95

1
Policies for some issues do not always total 100% because
the language in the guidelines was vague and fell under two or more
categories.
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Who's Minding Your Business?

corporate Governance

Shareholder Proposals
Poison Pills
Confidential Voting
Antigreenmail Proposals
Opt Out of State
Antitakeover Law
Equal Access to the
Proxy
Golden/Tin Parachutes
Adopt Cumulative Voting
Curtailment or Fixing of
Executive Compensation
Report on Directors/
Employees Formerly in
Government Service
Mandatory Retirement or
Tenure for Directors
Minimum Share Ownership
for Directors
Majority of Board
Consisting of Outside
Directors
Incentive Compensation
aid Salary Levels
Report on Salaries of
Directors & Employees
Social Policy Issues
Eliminate Preemptive
Rights
"Minor" Bylaw Changes
Purchase of Company's
Own Stock

Case
by
Case

No
Policy

For

Against

(%)

(%)

2
24
39

44
5
2

16
8
8

38
63
51

10

3

5

82

18
2
27

2
24
18

5
15
16

75
59
39

5

2

5

88

0

5

0

95

2

5

0

93

2

11

0

87

3

0

0

97

24

0

8

68

0
18

5
10

0
29

95
43

19
8

13
0

3
2

66
90

2

87

8
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